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Article · 2026-08-11 · 6 moments

Nvidia’s Risky Business

Nvidia is finding new ways for its customers to raise money, and it's expanding the risk of the AI buildout significantly. ✦ AI generated

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01
Anecdote

Jay Cooke's pioneering retail funding of the Northern Pacific Railway eventually led to the Panic of 1873, a multi-year depression, multi-decade deflation, and financial conditions that helped make Europe a tinderbox four decades later.

The author recounts how Jay Cooke, a Civil War hero, funded the Northern Pacific Railway through retail bond sales, a commission structure, and media control. When credit tightened in September 1873, his firm went bankrupt, triggering the Panic of 1873 and cascading economic catastrophe.

transcript

Stratechery author: Cooke soon found that his institutional peers agreed with his earlier refusal, and weren’t interested in his bonds, so he leaned on the same tactics he honed selling war bonds: appeals to patriotism, control of the media, and promises of railroad fortunes, backed by industrial-scale distribution. At the peak Cooke employed 1,500 salespeople and funded 1,300 newspapers (through a combination of advertising and direct payments) with a brand burnished by the Civil War. Retail investors could already buy railway bonds; Cooke made them his primary funding mechanism. ... The problem was that Northern Pacific’s capital needs were endless, and by September 1873, as credit tightened worldwide thanks to a crash on the Vienna stock exchange and the demonetization of silver, Cooke, who had been funding Northern Pacific from deposits in between bond issuances, could find no more buyers. The subsequent bankruptcy of Jay Cooke & Company triggered the Panic of 1873, culminating in endless railroad bankruptcies across the country, a multi-year depression, multi-decade deflation, and, one could argue, the financial conditions that made Europe, four decades later, into a tinder box.

02
Data

The hyperscalers are blowing through the debt markets — Oracle, Meta, Alphabet, and Amazon raised $108 billion in all of 2025 and already $194 billion in 2026 — with rising spreads and falling cover, plus Google's $85 billion equity issuance in early June, signaling a dangerously escalating reliance on external capital.

The author documents the scale of hyperscaler debt issuance — $80 billion combined between September and November, $194 billion in 2026 alone — alongside Google's unprecedented $85 billion equity raise, arguing this reflects a fundamental shift away from cash-flow-funded CapEx that Microsoft alone still maintains.

transcript

Stratechery author: Microsoft is the one hyperscaler still abiding by the dictum used to deny the existence of a bubble: its CapEx isn’t funded by debt. This was, believe it or not, a defense that could be used for nearly all of Big Tech a year ago; then, between September and November, Oracle, Meta, Alphabet, and Amazon issued a combined $80 billion in debt for building out infrastructure. That was only the beginning: after raising a combined $108 billion in all of 2025, these four companies have, as of July 7, already raised $194 billion this year. Unsurprisingly, spreads are rising, and 86% of the bonds issued this year are already trading at higher yields than at issuance. Cover for recent issuance has fallen to less than 2x, from 5x in February. The real shock, however, came at the beginning of June, when Google announced it would raise $85 billion in equity, including a special $10 billion issuance to the aforementioned Berkshire Hathaway.

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03
Claim

DeepMind is no longer a frontier lab and its odds of reaching SOTA again are zero, because Google's bureaucratic, painfully slow, and strategically timid culture — not its leadership — is the fundamental problem.

Following the departures of Demis Hassabis and Jeff Dean, the author (seconding SemiAnalysis) argues DeepMind is no longer a frontier lab. The core problem is Google's bureaucratic and timid culture — DeepMind had an AI chatbot a year before ChatGPT but wasn't allowed to release it — while Hassabis's world-model vision diverged from the text-and-code focus of other labs.

transcript

Stratechery author: For all intents and purposes, we believe DeepMind is no longer a frontier lab. We said as much a few months ago to our Tokenomics clients due to large numbers of departures from their reinforcement learning teams and poor compute allocation. Google will continue meandering on and releasing models, but their odds of reaching SOTA again have dropped to zero. ... The issue with Google was not Jeff Dean nor Noam Shazeer, but rather their extremely bureaucratic, painfully slow, and strategically timid culture. Remember that DeepMind had an AI chatbot 1 year before ChatGPT but was not allowed to release it due to fears of disrupting their core business.

04
Mechanism

Google's infrastructure bet is strong even if its frontier model ambitions are not: whether or not Google competes for the frontier, it is absolutely competing to dominate AI infrastructure, where TPUs give it a sustainable cost advantage that positions it as the hyperscaler most poised to make the most profit.

The author argues Google's Berkshire Hathaway bet is arguably good news. Google Cloud is growing 82% year-over-year, Google rents and even sells TPUs to Anthropic and Meta (including 20%+ of total TPU shipments), and because TPUs give a sustainable cost advantage, Google brings cash flow, debt, then equity to bear on profiting from the infrastructure build-out.

transcript

Stratechery author: whether or not Google is competing for the frontier, they are absolutely competing to dominate AI infrastructure. And, in a world where intelligence is a commodity, TPUs in particular are a big deal. ... It's hard to imagine a better option than Google. The company is not only investing in AI, but has optionality in terms of outcomes: its Services business benefits from the investment, it is in contention at the model layer with Gemini, and it can sell capacity to the frontier labs. Moreover, that capacity has a sustainable cost advantage because of TPUs, which means that in a world where compute becomes a commodity — as hard as that is to imagine right now — Google is the hyperscaler that is poised to make the most profit. Notice that I didn’t say margin; if that were Google’s concern they would almost certainly be making different choices. Profit, however, is an absolute number, and Google is bringing everything to bear — first its cash flow, then its debt, and now its equity — on making money from the infrastructure build-out.

05
Claim

Nvidia's partnerships with Apollo, BlackRock, Blackstone and other asset managers create AI factories as a new 'investable asset class' — a novel financing structure that bears substantially higher, unmarked risk than equity, drawing on safety-seeking insurance floats and pension-fund liabilities.

Nvidia announced financing platforms with a consortium of asset managers to mobilize over $500 billion of third-party capital. Unlike Google's equity (which dilutes upside without adding company risk), Nvidia preserves margins by finding pools of capital willing to bear risk, backstopping opportunities with up to 25% residual-value financing — a signal Huang believes his pitch more than the market does.

transcript

Stratechery author: Today, we announced partnerships with Apollo, BlackRock, Blackstone, Brookfield, Goldman Sachs and KKR to establish independent financing platforms designed to mobilize over $500 billion of third-party capital to support the buildout of AI infrastructure over time. ... What Apollo et al. are, are new sources of capital beyond the investment grade debt markets. In that sense this proposed structure is somewhat akin to Google’s equity issuance: a way to secure funding beyond bonds. The difference, however, is stark: whereas equity dilutes the upside for investors without adding risk to the company, this structure preserves Nvidia’s margins by finding new pools of capital willing to bear risk. It’s not a total free ride for Nvidia: the company is backstopping opportunities with up to 25% residual-value based financing, suggesting that Huang believes his “investable asset class” pitch much more than the market does.

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06
Prediction

Nvidia has a bigger structural problem: the pressure and possibility of escaping CUDA has never been higher, and if Anthropic and OpenAI win, Nvidia's profits — and its novel financing gamble — will be squeezed.

The author argues Nvidia's CUDA moat is weaker than ever because AI workloads now happen on top of models rather than CUDA frameworks, Anthropic has not depended on CUDA for years, and OpenAI is moving away for inference. The residual-value backstop even implies Nvidia's profits are already being squeezed.

transcript

Stratechery author: In the before-times, i.e. before the release of ChatGPT, Nvidia was building quite the (free) software moat around its GPUs; the challenge is that it wasn’t entirely clear who was going to use all of that software. Today, meanwhile, the use cases for those GPUs is very clear, and those use cases are happening at a much higher level than CUDA frameworks (i.e. on top of models); that, combined with the massive incentives towards finding cheaper alternatives to Nvidia, means both the pressure to and the possibility of escaping CUDA is higher than it has ever been (even if it is still distant for lower level work, particularly when it comes to training). The situation today, with Anthropic and OpenAI appearing to pull away, is even more problematic: Anthropic has not been dependent on CUDA for years, and OpenAI is moving in that direction, at least for inference. If those companies win then Nvidia’s profits will be squeezed — indeed, the implication of that backstop is they already are.

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