The Roman/Byzantine state's defining feature was its centuries-long internal stabilization and regrowth rather than its brief crises; its downfall came from unforeseeable external invasions, not internal decomposition.
Kaldellis argues against the traditional 'decline and fall' framing: the empire's crises were sudden external shocks it usually recovered from, while its true character was centuries of endogenous stability and growth — it never suffered separatism, tax-collection collapse, or internal partition until the very end. ✦ AI generated
Anthony Kaldellis · Lex Fridman · 2026-06-30 · original ↗
starts at this moment · 195:17
“So you mentioned this loop of thriving and then having to survive, surviving, that happens a few times throughout the history of the Roman Empire. It seems that societies in general oscillate in that way. Is there something particular you could say about the oscillations, the loops that the Roman Empire goes through?”
Should we define the society by these brief crises of exogenous shocks, or should we define it by the centuries-long, sometimes, periods of regrowth, consolidation, and stabilization, which are endogenous. Nobody came from the outside to help them rebuild... my answer is unequivocally the latter.
verbatim transcript · starts at 195:17
195:17you what they are, and we've talked about most of them so far. They don't last very long, and they are all sudden challenges that appear from the outside. In other words, they're exogenous shocks, that they can't really have prepared for. These shocks cause massive territorial loss, which requires adjustment, right? But they don't last that long. In other words, the Romans almost always, at some point, figure out how to hold a line, how to consolidate their position, regroup-
195:54and put their economy and their society back on a trajectory of revival, regrowth, and eventual reconquest. Always. Every single time, except the last time, right? And for me, this poses the following kind of dilemma, which I can answer. And the dilemma is, should we define the society by these brief crises of exogenous shocks, or should we define it by the centuries-long, sometimes, periods of regrowth, consolidation, and stabilization, which are endogenous.
196:36Nobody came from the outside to help them rebuild. Uh, and my answer is unequivocally the latter. So I see this as a society whose internal organization primes it to stabilize and embark on steady growth. Slow and gradual, but steady. And that's what I would like my field to explain more, and I'm gonna try to do so in the book I mentioned that I'm writing on, like, the longevity or the resilience of this society.
197:10And not try to center the crises, which I see as being from the outside. Like, these aren't... Of course, they're part of its story, but they're not coming from it. What's coming from it is the stability, and I think that's the more interesting part of this society. - Yeah, so the, you know, these peak-to-peak histories, as you can think of them, they miss the machinery in the valleys. Institutions,
- ·State defined by centuries of endogenous stability, not brief crises
- ·Growth and consolidation came from within, no outside rebuilding help
- ·Traditional 'decline and fall' framing is misleading
- ·Never suffered separatism or internal partition until the very end
- ·Tax collection never collapsed internally
- ·Downfall came from unforeseeable external invasions, not decomposition