Video · 2026-06-30 · 3h 52m · 24 moments

The Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire | Lex Fridman Podcast #498

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GUEST Anthony Kaldellis GUEST Lex Fridman

timeline · colored by role

Fact

The Crisis of the Third Century was a period of extreme instability in which 26 emperors were murdered in 50 years amid nonstop civil war, hyperinflation, economic collapse, and plague.

The hosts open by cataloguing the chaos of the third century — near-annual imperial murders, civil wars, hyperinflation, and a devastating plague — as a defining trauma of Roman history.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: 26 emperors were murdered in a period of 50 years... It's tremendous instability... Almost all were of these emperors were generals, and almost all were murdered by their men. So civil war was the norm, hyperinflation, economic crash, plus there's a plague.

supports · 1

Claim◆

The so-called Byzantine Empire never existed as something distinct from Rome; it was, in every legal and cultural sense, the Roman Empire continuing unbroken in the East, and its people called themselves Romans until the end.

Kaldellis argues the term 'Byzantine Empire' is a later historians' invention; the state and its citizens always identified as Roman, so the 'Byzantine' label misrepresents an unbroken continuity with ancient Rome.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: So Lex, the burden of proof is on those who would assert that what we've been calling the Byzantine Empire is something other than the Roman Empire, because all of our sources are very clear about this... But in fact, it called itself the Roman Empire. Its subjects were Roman citizens. They called themselves Romans all the way down through to the end and beyond.

Claim◆

The so-called Byzantine Empire was, in every legal and cultural sense, the Roman Empire continuing unbroken in the East — its people called themselves Romans and it called itself the Roman Empire all the way to 1453.

Kaldellis argues the label 'Byzantine Empire' is a historiographical invention; the state and its citizens continuously identified themselves as Roman from antiquity to 1453.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: So Lex, the burden of proof is on those who would assert that what we've been calling the Byzantine Empire is something other than the Roman Empire, because all of our sources are very clear about this... It's almost a form of cognitive dissonance, right? It's like when you know something is the case, but you carry on as if it's not.

extends · 1supports · 1

Claim◆

The Byzantine Empire never existed as something distinct from Rome; it was the Roman Empire continuing unbroken, and its people called themselves Romans throughout, right down to 1453.

Kaldellis argues the so-called Byzantine Empire was simply the continuing Roman Empire in the East, whose citizens identified as Romans, and that 'Byzantine' is a later historiographical invention driven by Western Europe's reluctance to include it in its cultural genealogy.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: So Lex, the burden of proof is on those who would assert that what we've been calling the Byzantine Empire is something other than the Roman Empire, because all of our sources are very clear about this. And we've known about this. We've always known about it. It's almost a form of cognitive dissonance, right?

Claim◆

The Byzantine Empire never existed as something distinct from Rome — it was the Roman Empire continuing unbroken, and its people always called themselves Romans.

Kaldellis argues the term 'Byzantine Empire' is a later historiographical invention; the state's own subjects, laws, and institutions considered it the Roman Empire continuing unbroken from antiquity to 1453.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: So Lex, the burden of proof is on those who would assert that what we've been calling the Byzantine Empire is something other than the Roman Empire, because all of our sources are very clear about this. And we've known about this. We've always known about it. It's almost a form of cognitive dissonance, right?

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Claim

The emperors' public persona — that they governed tirelessly, responsibly, and solely for the benefit of their subjects — was, according to the historical record, largely sincere and matched by real action rather than being empty propaganda.

Kaldellis describes a consistent imperial 'persona' of responsive, hardworking, accountable rule broadcast through laws and petitions, and argues research shows emperors generally lived up to it.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: Basically, that the authorities are responsive to the needs of their subjects, that they are often accountable. In other words, they understand that they are exercising public power, and that their mandate is to exercise it solely for the benefit of their subjects. They keep saying this... renouncing any kind of private interest.

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Claim

East Roman emperors were generally sincere in their public rhetoric of ruling for their subjects' benefit — they mostly did what they said they would do, rather than the rhetoric being mere propaganda detached from action.

Applying a Machiavellian standard of judging rulers by deeds rather than words, Kaldellis concludes that the Byzantine emperors' persona of selfless, responsive governance was largely borne out in practice, not just propaganda.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: In the case of the East Roman state, so my research suggests that the emperors and the authorities were generally sincere in what they said. In other words, I have found that they generally did what they said they were going to do overall. Not perfectly, obviously.

explains mechanism · 1

Data◆

Nearly half of all emperors in Constantinople were violently overthrown, which kept every emperor perpetually insecure and incentivized him to rule in ways that kept the populace content.

Kaldellis cites the statistic that about 46% of Constantinople's emperors were deposed by violence, arguing this constant threat functioned as the real check on imperial power.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: Something like 46% of the emperors of Constantinople are overthrown through violence. 46%. And that's almost half. Right? So that's a huge, that's a huge number, which means that every emperor is vulnerable and insecure, and they know it, right?

extends · 1

Data

Because no one had a hereditary right to the throne, emperors faced a constant threat of violent overthrow — 46% of Constantinople's emperors were deposed by violence — and this threat, not law, was the main check on imperial power.

Kaldellis explains that with no legitimate line of succession, roughly half of Byzantine emperors were violently deposed, making the ever-present risk of coup or riot the real check on power, enacted through public acclamation in venues like the Hippodrome.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: I'll give you some statistics. Something like 46% of the emperors of Constantinople are overthrown through violence. 46%. And that's almost half. Right? So that's a huge, that's a huge number, which means that every emperor is vulnerable and insecure, and they know it, right?

extends · 1

Mechanism

Because Constantinople lacked electoral institutions, the Hippodrome and other mass gatherings functioned as a 'perpetual referendum,' where public acclamation or booing acted like an ongoing opinion poll that emperors had to heed.

Kaldellis explains that without elections, the Eastern Roman Empire relied on crowds in the Hippodrome and other public spaces chanting acclamations or jeers, forcing emperors to respond to public sentiment in real time.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: Elections give a government a mandate for, I don't know, four or five years, and during that period, you may be unpopular, but you're legitimate... Whereas in Constantinople, we don't have those kinds of institutions. We have instead an ongoing referendum. We just call it a perpetual referendum, right? And in fact, the emperors are, they're conducting opinion polls in a sense because they appear in public.

extends · 1

Mechanism

Constantinople's Hippodrome and other public gathering places functioned as a 'perpetual referendum' where mass acclamation or booing of the emperor served the role elections play in modern democracies.

Kaldellis explains that instead of elections, the Eastern Roman Empire had an 'ongoing referendum' — emperors appeared before crowds who would cheer or boo them, giving real-time feedback emperors were desperate not to lose.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: Elections give a government a mandate for, I don't know, four or five years, and during that period, you may be unpopular, but you're legitimate, right, because of the institutions. Whereas in Constantinople, we don't have those kinds of institutions. We have instead an ongoing referendum. We just call it a perpetual referendum, right? And in fact, the emperors are conducting opinion polls in a sense because they appear in public.

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Claim

The Edict of Caracalla's extension of Roman citizenship to nearly all free inhabitants of the empire was not a hollow gesture — it had real teeth, and within a generation provincials rose to occupy the empire's highest offices, including the throne itself.

Kaldellis contrasts Rome's 212 AD universal citizenship grant with other empires' hollow gestures, noting it genuinely enabled provincials to become emperors and top officials within a generation.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: What's significant about the Roman case is that not only did they extend citizenship to everybody, but they meant it. This is something that had teeth. In other words, it meant that the rights and opportunities that were available to Roman citizens... are now available to everybody. And within a generation, you have a situation where, like, all of the emperors are provincials.

Fact

The Edict of Caracalla, which extended Roman citizenship to nearly all free inhabitants of the empire in 212 AD, was not merely symbolic — it was fully implemented, and within a generation provincials rose to become emperors and the most powerful officials in Rome.

Kaldellis highlights that unlike token gestures by other empires, Caracalla's 212 AD edict granting universal citizenship had real teeth — within a generation provincials became emperors and top officials, unlike anything seen in later empires such as Britain's.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: What's significant about the Roman case is that not only did they extend citizenship to everybody, but they meant it. This is something that had teeth. In other words, it meant that the rights and opportunities that were available to Roman citizens are now available to everybody. And within a generation, you have a situation where, like, all of the emperors are provincials.

Fact

The Edict of Caracalla (212 AD) extended Roman citizenship to nearly all free inhabitants of the empire, and unlike token gestures in other empires, Rome actually meant it — within a generation, provincials rose to become emperors and the empire's most powerful officials.

Kaldellis highlights the Constitutio Antoniniana of 212 AD as a turning point that gave real rights and access to power to provincials empire-wide, rapidly producing provincial emperors and officials — something no other empire, ancient or modern, ever matched.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: Imagine a situation where, like, no modern empire has ever done this really, right? When what's significant about the Roman case is that not only did they extend citizenship to everybody, but they meant it. This is something that had teeth... within a generation, you have a situation where, like, all of the emperors are provincials.

Fact

The Edict of Caracalla extended Roman citizenship to nearly all free inhabitants of the empire, and unlike other empires' token gestures, this grant had real teeth: within a generation, provincials could and did become emperors and the most powerful officials in the state.

Kaldellis highlights that the Constitutio Antoniniana was not symbolic — it gave provincials real access to power, producing provincial emperors and elites within a single generation, something no other empire (e.g., Britain with India) ever matched.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: So imagine a situation where, like, no modern empire has ever done this really, right? When what's significant about the Roman case is that not only did they extend citizenship to everybody, but they meant it. This is something that had teeth... And within a generation, you have a situation where, like, all of the emperors are provincials, right?

Context

In the 3rd-century Crisis, 26 emperors were murdered in 50 years, with civil war effectively the norm alongside hyperinflation, economic collapse, and plague, making it a period of tremendous political instability.

The hosts and Kaldellis describe the Crisis of the Third Century as a perfect storm of assassinated emperors, nonstop civil wars, hyperinflation, and plague that nearly tore the empire apart.

transcript

Lex Fridman: So there's civil wars nonstop. Almost all were, of these emperors were generals, and almost all were murdered by their men. So civil war was the norm, hyperinflation, economic crash, plus there's a plague, from 249 to 262 AD, which is a pandemic, possibly smallpox or Ebola.

supports · 1

Context

The Crisis of the Third Century was a genuine perfect storm — a legitimacy crisis, civil wars, foreign invasions, hyperinflation, and plague — that nearly caused the Roman Empire to disintegrate.

Kaldellis describes the third-century crisis as a true 'perfect storm' of civil wars, the rise of a bellicose Sasanian Persia, inflation, and plague that nearly broke the empire apart before Aurelian and Diocletian restored it.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: Yeah, it's a perfect storm. Yeah, I mean, you have a crisis of imperial legitimacy. Basically, the army's proclaiming emperors left and right. But you also have a serious uptick in foreign invasions. In the north, you have the creation of the Sasanian Persian or Iranian Empire in the east, and this was very, very bellicose. So lots of foreign defeats. And so under the pressure of all of those forces, it almost fell apart.

rebuts · 1

Claim

The East Roman Empire should not be considered a military dictatorship because, despite emperors controlling large armies, the army was almost never used as an instrument of internal social control against the population.

Kaldellis distinguishes the Byzantine state from a military dictatorship: although armies could make and unmake emperors through civil war, they were essentially never turned inward to suppress civilians, because rulers relied on consensus rather than repression to stay in power.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: Here's why I don't think the Eastern Roman Empire is a military dictatorship. Even though, again, the emperors control the armies, and the armies themselves will often have a say in who becomes emperor... The reason why I don't think it's a military dictatorship is because they almost never, very, very, very rarely use the army as an instrument of social control.

Claim

The Eastern Roman Empire was not a military dictatorship, because although emperors controlled the armies and armies influenced succession through civil wars, the state almost never used the army as an instrument of social control against its own population.

Kaldellis argues that despite army-driven succession and civil wars, the East Roman state resisted the common historical pattern of using its military to suppress its own citizens, distinguishing it from true military dictatorships.

transcript

Claim

The Eastern Roman Empire was not a military dictatorship because, despite emperors controlling the armies, the army was almost never used as an instrument of internal social control against the population.

Kaldellis argues that despite emperors relying on the military for power and succession disputes, the East Roman state doesn't qualify as a military dictatorship because the army was almost never turned inward to suppress its own population.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: Here's why I don't think the Eastern Roman Empire is a military dictatorship. Even though, again, the emperors control the armies, and the armies themselves will often have a say in who becomes emperor, like through the civil wars that we mentioned. The reason why I don't think it's a military dictatorship is because they almost never, very, very, very rarely use the army as an instrument of social control.

Claim◆

The Roman/Byzantine Empire's long survival should be explained by its centuries-long internal capacity for self-driven recovery and steady growth after crises, not by the crises themselves, which were brief external shocks.

Kaldellis argues historians should define this society by its long endogenous periods of internal stabilization and regrowth rather than by its brief, externally-caused crises — every crisis except the last was followed by recovery.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: The Romans almost always, at some point, figure out how to hold a line, how to consolidate their position, regroup, and put their economy and their society back on a trajectory of revival, regrowth, and eventual reconquest. Always. Every single time, except the last time. I see this as a society whose internal organization primes it to stabilize and embark on steady growth.

Claim◆

The Roman/Byzantine state's defining feature was its centuries-long internal stabilization and regrowth rather than its brief crises; its downfall came from unforeseeable external invasions, not internal decomposition.

Kaldellis argues against the traditional 'decline and fall' framing: the empire's crises were sudden external shocks it usually recovered from, while its true character was centuries of endogenous stability and growth — it never suffered separatism, tax-collection collapse, or internal partition until the very end.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: Should we define the society by these brief crises of exogenous shocks, or should we define it by the centuries-long, sometimes, periods of regrowth, consolidation, and stabilization, which are endogenous. Nobody came from the outside to help them rebuild... my answer is unequivocally the latter.

rebuts · 1

Claim◆

The East Roman Empire's extraordinary longevity came from deep internal resilience, not luck — its territorial losses were always caused by sudden external shocks it could not have foreseen, while for centuries at a time it consolidated, regrew, and never saw provinces try to secede or fragment on their own.

Kaldellis argues the empire should be defined by its centuries of endogenous stability and regrowth rather than its rare crises, since no province ever tried to break away and the center never lost its ability to tax or govern until repeated foreign conquest finally overwhelmed it.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: You never see movements to split away. That is, there's no separatist movements, at least not on the part of any Roman provincials... You also never have a moment when the center loses its ability to tax its territories... So if you're looking at the kinds of factors that cause states to fail, fragment, you know, become ungovernable, these never happen.

Claim◆

The empire's extraordinary longevity rested on two pillars: authorities sincerely persuaded (and largely proved to) subjects that power was exercised on their behalf, and a tightly unified Roman-Orthodox identity that made subjects prefer their own rulers over any alternative.

Asked why the empire held together for over a millennium without internal fragmentation, Kaldellis gives a two-part answer: sincere responsive rule by authorities and a strong shared Roman-Orthodox identity that made outside rule unattractive.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: First is that an extraordinary effort was made by the authorities to persuade their subjects that they were ruling on their behalf, and I think, for the most part, actually tended to do so. And the second is that it had a very tightly unified identity as Roman and as Orthodox... they did not want to live under the power of non-Romans and non-Christian people.

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