The key difficulty in any peace deal for Ukraine is that there is no guarantee of security that Ukrainians can trust — having been let down by Western guarantees before — and the temptation will be to pressure the more accessible party, Ukraine, rather than Russia, which would reward the aggressor.

(00:00:00) The following is a conversation with Douglas Murray, author of The War in the West, The Madness of Crowds, and his new book on Democracies and Death Cults. (00:00:11) We talk about Russia and Ukraine, and about Israel and Gaza. (00:00:16) Douglas has very strong views on these topics, and he defends them brilliantly and fearlessly. (00:00:23) As I always try to do for all topics, I will also talk to people who have different views from Douglas, including on the next episode of this podcast. (00:00:33) We live in an era of online discourse where grifters, drama farmers, liars, bots, sycophants, and sociopaths roam the vast, beautiful, dark land of the internet. (00:00:45) It's hard to know who to trust. (00:00:48) I believe no one is in possession of the entire truth. (00:00:53) but some are more correct than others. (00:00:56) Some are insightful, and some are delusional. (00:01:00) The problem is it's hard to tell which is which, unless you use your mind with intellectual humility and with rigor. (00:01:10) I recommend you listen to many sources who disagree with each other and try to pick up wisdom from each. (00:01:16) Also, I recommend you visit the places in question, as Douglas has, as I have, (00:01:22) or at least talk face to face with people who have spent most of their lives living there, whether it's Israel, Palestine, Ukraine, or Russia. (00:01:33) Let's try, together, to not be cogs in the machine of outrage, and instead to reach towards reason and compassion. (00:01:42) There is no Hitler, Stalin, or Mao on the world stage today. (00:01:46) Plus, there are thousands of nuclear weapons ready to fire. (00:01:50) Human civilization hangs in the balance. (00:01:55) The 21st century is a new geopolitical puzzle all of us are tasked with solving. (00:02:02) Let's not mess it up. 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(00:08:24) And if you have the patience to believe in the long-term effects of daily rituals and daily habits, you'd be surprised, I am constantly surprised, if I do a thing every day and I wake up two, three months after and just see how good I got at that thing. (00:08:42) It's kind of incredible. (00:08:43) And then you, of course, have to protect that habit. (00:08:46) It gets harder and harder every year with all the fascinating stuff going on online. (00:08:51) You just have to shut it all off and do the thing, do the habit every day. (00:08:57) Anyway, they'll give you one month's supply of fish oil when you sign up at DrinkAG1.com slash Lex. (00:09:05) This is a Lex Friedman podcast. (00:09:08) To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description. (00:09:11) And now, dear friends, here's Douglas Murray. (00:09:32) What have you understood about the war in Ukraine from your visits there? (00:09:36) Just looking at the big picture of your understanding of the invasion of February 24, 2022 and the war in the three years since. (00:09:44) Well, I mean, several things. (00:09:46) There's (00:09:48) political angles which are forever changing, but on the human level, as if you visit troops, frontline troops, you have that admiration for people defending their country, defending their homes, defending their families. (00:10:04) I'm struck by the way in which that is at a remove from the sort of political noise and the media noise and much more. (00:10:14) It's very easy to get caught up in the (00:10:18) twos and froes of today's news. (00:10:20) But that, to my mind, that's the single thing that struck me most in my visits there. (00:10:27) It's just the people I've met who are fighting for a cause which at that level is unavoidable, undeniable. (00:10:38) So the thing that struck you is different from the media turmoil is just the reality of war. (00:10:45) Yeah, of course. (00:10:46) I mean, people who have either lived under Russian occupation from invading armies and then come back out into the world, having been liberated as in late 2022, or the people now, organized most recently there in recent weeks, who were just getting on with their job as soldiers, (00:11:10) whilst the world was talking about them. (00:11:12) When were you there? (00:11:14) Early on in this escalated war of 22? (00:11:18) Yes, first time was in, I was with the Ukrainian armed forces when they retook Kherson and I was back in recent weeks and was there when the Trump-Zelensky blowup happened. (00:11:32) In fact, I was with a, I was in a Ukrainian dugout at the front lines when I was watching it. (00:11:39) How's the morale, how's the way the content of the conversations you've heard different from the two visits separated by, I guess, two years? (00:11:52) At one level, I mean, nothing has changed much. (00:11:55) You know, it's a sort of, it's not a total standoff because intermittently each side gains territory from the others, but it's not, I mean, there's been no, (00:12:07) very significant military gains by either side in the interim period. (00:12:12) I think my experience of the soldiers, the people of Ukraine early on in the war, there's an intense optimism about the outcomes of the war. (00:12:23) There's a sense that they're going to win. (00:12:26) And the definition of what win means was like, all the territory is going to be won back. (00:12:35) Yeah, I certainly (00:12:37) on the front lines facing Crimea was, became quite familiar with people who thought that the Ukrainians in late 2022 would even be able to get Crimea back. (00:12:46) And that struck me even at the time. (00:12:48) And I said, I thought that was an overreach. (00:12:51) And now I think the people, the soldiers, at least in my experience when I visited a second time, are more exhausted. (00:13:04) The morale. (00:13:06) The dreams, the certainty of victory has maybe faded from the forefront of their minds. (00:13:14) Well, three years of war will tire out anyone. (00:13:18) What did you think of the blow up between Zelensky and Trump as you're sitting there in the dugout? (00:13:24) Well, it is, it was a very disturbing place to watch it from, perhaps anywhere it would have been. (00:13:33) And (00:13:35) I mean, obviously it was a meeting that shouldn't have happened. (00:13:37) It was far too early. (00:13:39) Why do you think so? (00:13:40) There's not enough actual pathways to peace on the table. (00:13:44) Well, I think the mineral deal, I mean, I love the fact that everyone's now an expert in Eastern Ukrainian mineral deposits. (00:13:50) But I think as I've learned, and we'll talk about Israel and Palestine, I'm learning that everybody's an expert on geopolitics and history of war on the internet. (00:13:59) And now mineral deposits, obviously. (00:14:01) Yes. (00:14:01) The, I'm really speaking of the (00:14:04) edge of my mineral deposit knowledge here. (00:14:07) No, I mean, from what I could see, the deal that the American administration was trying to get the Ukrainian government to sign was sort of too early, too forced. (00:14:19) The Ukrainians weren't, were ready to sign a deal, but were obviously under intense pressure. (00:14:25) And I think certainly Zelensky wasn't expecting to, actually wasn't expecting to go until pretty much the day before (00:14:36) was obviously visibly tired and exhausted again, as you are after that amount of pressure for that long a time. (00:14:43) And no, I mean, the thing that struck me, and I said this in my column in your post from there, that the thing that struck me was I said to some of the soldiers I was with, you know, what do you make of this? (00:14:57) And, you know, one of them just said to me, (00:15:01) we're advised not to follow too closely the ins and outs of the politics of this, and, but of course everyone has Instagram or scrolls and among dog pictures and the, hot women or whatever is, what happened in the Oval. (00:15:18) And, but what struck me was this same guy and saying, I've got a job to do. (00:15:24) Right. (00:15:25) And there's a clarity and a wisdom to that. (00:15:31) But your job is bigger than that, right? (00:15:37) It's to understand the politics as well. (00:15:39) And what do you think about the politics of that moment? (00:15:42) Because that was a real opportunity to come together and make progress on peace, right? (00:15:48) And it, by all accounts, was not a successful step forward. (00:15:53) I don't think by any account it was a successful step forward, unless (00:15:58) To some extent it was a play, but from DC to say to Putin, look, we duffed off Zelensky and now give us something. (00:16:08) That's the only remedial idea I have about what might have been behind it. (00:16:15) But I think it was just one of those extremely, I mean, just awful political moments. (00:16:24) Zelensky was obviously (00:16:27) deeply irritated by the interpretation of the war that he was hearing from Washington. (00:16:36) It was only a week after the Trump comments about Zelensky being a dictator and people in the administration implying that Ukraine has started the war. (00:16:48) And I think that's, that must be for Zelensky, a pretty Alice in Wonderland (00:16:56) situation to be in. (00:16:58) And I had significant sympathy for him in finding it bewildering because it would be bewildering. (00:17:06) I think the sad thing to me also on the mundane details of that meeting and just the unfortunate way that meetings happen, I think it's true that he was also exhausted. (00:17:17) Yes. (00:17:18) There was a dickhead of a reporter. (00:17:21) that was asked the question about outfit in a way that, listen, Zelensky, everybody has their strengths and weaknesses. (00:17:29) He's an emotional being, for better or for worse. (00:17:32) And there's a dumb dig head of a reporter. (00:17:36) Marjorie Taylor Greene's boyfriend. (00:17:39) He is. (00:17:40) The things you know. (00:17:41) See, you're a real journalist. (00:17:43) He's from one of the new, I'm all for opening up the White House press pool and all that sort of thing, but it means that you get some people in who are sort of (00:17:52) from a blog land, there's nothing wrong with that, but it means that you get somebody who will do something like that. (00:17:58) The problem with that interaction, as I saw it, was that guy asked that, well, disrespectful question. (00:18:05) And I think it was disrespectful. (00:18:09) I'll very quickly say why. (00:18:11) I mean, I think that when a man comes from the realm of war into the realm of peace, (00:18:18) the people in the realm of peace should have some respect or at least concession that the other man has come from the realm of war. (00:18:26) And that if you're sitting in a political environment where you talk about people being destroyed and decimated and defenestrated and much more to a man who's for whom none of that is metaphorical, (00:18:47) I think that's extremely hard to accept. (00:18:52) And I think that probably also at that moment, there was a sort of sense of, Zelensky is being disrespected by being asked about what he's wearing. (00:19:06) When, as everyone knows, Churchill during World War II used to wear his fatigues on foreign visits, and it's just that, just to remind people that you're coming from the realm of war. (00:19:16) And I think that probably in that moment, one of the things that would have been going through his head would be, but I mean, if this was Putin sitting here being assaulted by a journalist, you'd hope your host stepped in and defended you. (00:19:31) I mean, if, let me try this one out. (00:19:33) I mean, if a journalist in the Oval Office, if Putin was sitting there, or a putative journalist said to Putin, you know, (00:19:42) everyone knows you've had a lot of facial work done and word is you've used the same guy that Berlusconi used to use. (00:19:50) Can you comment on that? (00:19:53) You'd say, well, that's a kind of disrespectful question for journalists to ask and it's a little bit off what needs to be gone over. (00:20:07) And it's the same thing with Zelensky with the outfit. (00:20:10) I think it was just petty and threw things off in a bad way. (00:20:14) Yeah, and it was poorly researched because I think Zelensky was explaining this like three years ago at the beginning of the war, why he wears what he wears. (00:20:22) And he's been consistent wearing the same. (00:20:24) It's also, by the way, it's an example of the frivolity of a lot of the attempts to understand what's going on. (00:20:32) I mean, my view is that since actually most people, in fact, everybody cannot be an expert on everything, one of the things that we always do is to seize on minor and really quite unimportant things. (00:20:46) I mean, every side does it. (00:20:48) Look at the way in which the American right for years talked about the Churchill bust leaving the White House Oval Office in the Obama years. (00:20:56) I didn't want to hear another darn thing about the Churchill bust after eight years, because (00:21:02) It just, it was in lieu of trying to understand and actually critique Obama's foreign policy. (00:21:09) It was just an easy shorthand. (00:21:11) I think it's the same. (00:21:12) We're always tempted to that. (00:21:14) But the thing is, I think you mentioned Putin. (00:21:17) I think Putin would have been able to respond himself to that journalist effectively. (00:21:24) And (00:21:25) he would have done it in Russian. (00:21:27) Oh yeah, the language thing. (00:21:29) Yeah, so I wanted to sort of lay out several just unfortunate things that happen in these situations. (00:21:35) And I think it happens in all peace negotiations, and it's funny how history can turn in moments like this. (00:21:40) I do think there's a dickhead reporter combined with the fact that, you know, with all due respect, but Zelensky's English sometimes is not very good. (00:21:49) Yes, and apart from anything else, if he had agreed to have not done it in English, he would have bought himself the extra seconds in some of his replies that he needed, yeah. (00:21:56) Yeah, and have the wit, the guy is funny, witty, intelligent, you know, he could do that in the native language of whether it's Ukrainian or Russian to be able to respond and get the interpreter. (00:22:09) So (00:22:11) All of that is really unfortunate because I think in those little moments, it's a dance. (00:22:16) And there's an opportunity there. (00:22:18) You know, the Republicans, the right wing in the United States have a general kind of skepticism of Zelensky. (00:22:25) But that doesn't mean it has to be that way. (00:22:28) It can turn, it can change, it can evolve. (00:22:31) It's very interesting why it has happened. (00:22:32) Why do you think it's happened? (00:22:36) Politics in the United States is so dumb that at the very beginning, it could just be reduced to, well, the left went Putin bad, Zelensky good, rah, rah, Ukrainian flags. (00:22:50) Therefore, the right must go the opposite. (00:22:52) It's sometimes it's literally as dumb as that. (00:22:55) Let's each pick a side and call the other dumb. (00:22:58) I had a line I used recently. (00:23:02) the necessity of people who live too long online to try to wade their way out of the memes. (00:23:07) It is so like that, isn't it? (00:23:09) Because yes, I mean, I can understand the people who find it very irritating that so many people who would put BLM flags or pride flags or, you know, trans flags in their bio, then put Ukrainian flags in their bio, despite almost certainly not knowing where Ukraine was. (00:23:23) And if that happens, the inevitable instinct of a lot of people who aren't really thinking is to say, (00:23:31) That's really annoying. (00:23:32) These people are really annoying. (00:23:33) I'll sock it to them. (00:23:34) But that's where you've got to try to rise above that and say, actually, funnily enough, the fate of a country doesn't depend on my tolerance for memes online today. (00:23:43) Yeah, so I think the memes can be broken through in meetings like the one that happened between Zelenskyy and Trump. (00:23:52) There can have been real camaraderie. (00:23:55) I've seen the skill of that just recently, having researched deeply and interacted with Narendra Modi. (00:24:02) Here's somebody who has the skill of, you know, for his country, for his situation, being able to somehow be friends with Putin and friends with Zelensky and friends with Trump and friends with Biden and friends with Obama. (00:24:18) That's very skillful. (00:24:20) And that, while still being (00:24:24) strong for his country and fundamentally a nationalist figure who's like, very not globalist, not anything but pro-India, India first, nation first. (00:24:39) In fact, nation first with a very specific idea what that nation represents. (00:24:46) And that, you know, Zelensky could do all of those things, but have the skill of navigating (00:24:53) the Trump room, because every single leader has their own peculiar quirks that need to be navigated. (00:24:59) Yes, the obvious one, I mean, I don't want to make it sound like it was all Zelensky's fault, but I mean, the obvious one was at the beginning of the meeting to say yet again, as he has done for three years, thank you to America and the American people and American politicians from across the aisle for your support for my country and it's our of need. (00:25:14) We're deeply grateful. (00:25:16) And because he, for once, forgot to say that. (00:25:20) I think it's not that simple. (00:25:22) I think there's a- It's not that simple. (00:25:23) It's one reason. (00:25:24) I think saying thank you, he didn't need to say thank you. (00:25:26) There is- Well, Jeff, that was why Vance, that was what Vance leapt in on. (00:25:29) He's just picking a thing to leap on. (00:25:32) There's a whole energy. (00:25:34) You have to acknowledge in your way of being that you have been very Biden, buddy, buddy with the left for the last four years. (00:25:45) There's ways to fix that. (00:25:46) Listen, these people are complicated narcissists, all of them, Biden, Trump. (00:25:52) You have to navigate the complexity of that. (00:25:55) And you basically have to say a kind word to Trump, which is like showing there's many ways of doing that. (00:26:03) But one of them is saying, (00:26:06) feeding the ego by acknowledging that he is one of the world's greatest negotiators, right? (00:26:11) I'm glad we're able to come to the table and negotiate together, because I believe you are the great negotiator, mediator that can actually bring a successful resolution to, as opposed to have an energy of like, (00:26:26) It should be obvious to everybody that Ukrainians are the good guys and Russia is the bad guys. (00:26:31) There's this whole energy of entitlement that he brought. (00:26:34) He forgot that there's a new guy. (00:26:36) You got to like convince the new guy that this global mission that this nation is on, this war that is in many ways the West versus the East, (00:26:52) that there's ideals, there's whole histories here that this is a war worth winning. (00:26:59) You have to convince them, right? (00:27:00) Yeah, no, sure. (00:27:01) And he obviously failed on that occasion. (00:27:04) But as I say, it must be bewildering to have landed in a place where people were seriously talking about Ukraine starting the war and Zelensky, not Putin, being the dictator. (00:27:18) I did the front page of the New York Post, the (00:27:22) day after the president's comments on that, saying that the big picture of Putin just saying, right, this is a dictator. (00:27:28) And, you know, I think that people can be lithe enough to be able to recognize that, you know, you can make criticisms of Zelensky or the Ukrainians, but it doesn't mean you have to fall for Putin. (00:27:42) And again, unfortunately, a lot of people in our time don't have that capability. (00:27:48) Can we go right into it? (00:27:50) What is your strongest criticism of Putin? (00:27:53) He's A dictator who's very bloody, as repressive as you can be of political opposition, internal opposition. (00:28:01) He's A kleptomaniac of his country's resources, has enriched himself as much as he could, as he has with the cronies around him. (00:28:12) He's not just acted to (00:28:16) destroy internal opposition in Russia, but has gone to other countries, including my own country of birth, and killed people on their, our soil, using, as it happens, weapons of mass destruction. (00:28:32) The use of polonium in the center of London, not good. (00:28:37) The use of incredibly dangerous nerve agents that could kill 10s of thousands of people in a charming (00:28:43) cathedral city like Salisbury, not good. (00:28:46) If the sort of apologist of Putin would say, well, he's just a sort of tough man, he's looking after his house business. (00:28:52) Well, I don't think, even if you think he has the right to do that, he should be doing it in third countries, deliberately using weapons that are meant to show that you could take out 10s of thousands of British citizens. (00:29:08) Yeah, I mean, that's (00:29:10) Just for starters. (00:29:11) What do you make for, do you think he's actually popularly elected? (00:29:16) No. (00:29:17) Do you think the results of the elections are fraudulent? (00:29:22) Yes, I mean. (00:29:23) Do you think it's possible that it's just that the opposition has been eliminated and he's legitimately popularly elected? (00:29:32) It definitely helps a chap if he's killed all of his opponents. (00:29:36) Something about using the term chap in that context is just marvelous. (00:29:40) But I know, I mean, seriously, you, if people are worried about, this is another of the sort of slightly Alice in Wonderland things recently about Zelensky, as people are saying, why hasn't he's a dictator because he hasn't held elections during a total war of self-defense. (00:29:57) And it's like, well, you know, if you're really, really passionate about free and fair elections in that neck of the woods, (00:30:06) you'd at least notice that Russian elections are not free and fair in any meaningful sense. (00:30:13) But this doesn't mean that you have to say that therefore they should have Western-style elections and freedom, that Russia is ready to go and become a Western liberal democracy. (00:30:23) It doesn't mean any of that at all. (00:30:24) It's just at least note that this is what Putin is. (00:30:29) What do you think is the motivation for his invasion of Ukraine in 22? (00:30:34) It's what he's said for years, which is basically the reconstitution of the Soviet Union. (00:30:41) Do you think there is empire building components to that motivation? (00:30:46) I would trust most my friends in Eastern Central Europe who certainly do think that. (00:30:54) There's a reason why the Baltic countries are the countries that are spending highest in percentage of GDP on defense, and it's because they're very worried. (00:31:03) I don't think they're faking it. (00:31:06) I don't think they're faking it for me or for anyone else. (00:31:09) I think the Lithuanians, Latvians, the Estonians and others are genuinely worried for the first time in some decades. (00:31:16) Do you think there's a possibility that the war continues indefinitely? (00:31:24) Even if there's a ceasefire and the peace reached, the war will resume and he will seek expansion even beyond Ukraine? (00:31:32) Yes. (00:31:33) And the most obvious thing is that if Trump manages to negotiate a ceasefire, it'll be a temporary pause, and whoever comes in as president after Trump, Putin will use the opportunity to advance again. (00:31:49) Yes. (00:31:50) Again, one of the things that I have heard from parts of the American right and others is that all he wants is Ukraine, that that's all he wants, and that he has no history (00:32:03) or of rhetoric or actions that suggest anything else. (00:32:07) And again, it's one of the reasons why it's useful traveling to places and seeing things with your own eyes, because I very much remember being in the country of Georgia after Putin tried to invade in 2008. (00:32:19) So I just, again, people don't have to be the greatest supporters of the Ukrainian cause just to recognize that (00:32:28) that it doesn't seem to be the case that Ukraine is the only thing in Putin's vision. (00:32:35) Do you see value and maybe depth and power to the realist perspective of all this? (00:32:41) You know, somebody like John Mearsheimer's formulation of all this, that in these invasions of Georgia, of Ukraine, (00:32:50) It's using military power to expand the sphere of influence in the region in a cold calculation of geopolitics. (00:33:00) It's interesting. (00:33:00) One of the fascinating things about the last few years is that there's been an act of sort of necromancy of certain figures who were totally, totally debunked in the area of Ukraine, Mearsheimer. (00:33:14) And (00:33:15) in the case of Israel, people like Finkelstein. (00:33:18) And it's been interesting because these are people that one hadn't heard of for some years because they were not listened to, usually for good reason. (00:33:27) But by the way, first of all, I'm very skeptical of the term realist in foreign policy because most people, to some extent, will say that they are a realist in foreign policy. (00:33:40) Very few people are surrealists in foreign policy. (00:33:45) Very few people are unrealists. (00:33:47) I would like to meet them. (00:33:48) A surrealist foreign policy analyst. (00:33:51) We did mention Alice in Wonderland, so. (00:33:53) Yeah, I mean, maybe we should introduce the term. (00:33:56) But I mean, if you want to say, if you want to look gimlet out, eyed out across the world, you're a realist. (00:34:04) I think the steel man of their argument would be Russia has or believes it has a sphere of influence. (00:34:12) and it is regrettable, but there's very little we can do about that. (00:34:19) would be about the best version of that argument that you can make. (00:34:24) Well, to expand on that steel man, isn't this how superpowers operate in the dark, realist slash surrealist way? (00:34:33) Meaning the United States uses military power to have a sphere of influence over the whole globe, really. (00:34:43) China appears to be willing to use military power to expand its sphere of influence. (00:34:48) And political power, yeah, more importantly in the case of China. (00:34:51) Political power. (00:34:52) Non-kinetic warfare to take over areas, Hong Kong being the obvious one. (00:34:59) Behind that, isn't there always a kinetic threat? (00:35:03) Oh yeah, of course, yeah. (00:35:04) I mean, you disappear some booksellers and students who are protesting, of course. (00:35:11) I just, but to go back to this, of course. (00:35:14) Okay, countries believe they have or would like to have spheres of influence. (00:35:18) I do think at some point that the so-called realists on that have to try to decide how much leeway that allows you to give to a fairly rapacious regime. (00:35:32) And it's not, I mean, it's not the easiest calculation always to make. (00:35:37) You have to work out whether or not, for instance, it is true that if Russia had, if Putin had managed to go all the way to Kyiv in the first weeks of the war in 22, he would have gone straight on to other places. (00:35:52) And, you know, maybe he would have done, maybe he would have taken his time, maybe he wouldn't have done. (00:35:57) And this is a very fine calculation that changes every week, let alone every year. (00:36:05) my friends in Georgia, I thought were wildly off the mark when they were believing that after 2008, they could get, for instance, either NATO membership or EU membership. (00:36:17) And I thought that was completely unlikely. (00:36:19) And I still think it's unlikely and almost certainly undesirable for Europe and for NATO, because you've got to be very careful. (00:36:26) And obviously, this is one of the issues with Ukraine and has been since the 90s is (00:36:33) are you going to set up a tripwire to start World War Three? (00:36:36) And that's not a small thing to consider. (00:36:38) So what do you think the peace deal might look like? (00:36:45) And what does the path to peace look like in Ukraine in the coming weeks and months? (00:36:50) I just thought it would be, regrettably, the Ukrainians ceding some territory in the east. (00:36:58) And then making sure they rearm (00:37:03) during whatever peace period comes afterwards. (00:37:07) And probably all four territories of Donetsk-Lukhan's separation of Kherson. (00:37:16) You couldn't lay any of that out because it has to be negotiated on. (00:37:19) But I mean, I think that and I think the ease with which non-Ukrainians are currently speaking about the Ukrainian ceding territory is concerning because these territories include (00:37:30) hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens who do not want to live under Putin's rule, and people who have families in the rest of Ukraine and much more. (00:37:41) And I recently interviewed children who had managed to get out of the Russian-occupied areas. (00:37:51) And it's brutal for a Ukrainian to be growing up (00:37:59) in that territory. (00:38:02) So when people say, obviously, Donetsk has to be given to Putin, I think that is not as easy a thing if you're in Ukraine as it is if you're sitting in New York, say. (00:38:16) And by the way, I think that on the issue of there is a school of thought that is that obviously President Trump to some extent was floating in recent weeks, which is that if (00:38:29) if a deal is done, a business deal in relation to minerals or anything else, you get this great, you get a kind of buffer zone of American businesses and investment and therefore American business people in the region, which would effectively warn Putin not to invade. (00:38:48) I don't follow that idea because not least there were Americans in the regions that were invaded in 22 and they left fast. (00:38:58) And we know from Hong Kong and other places, just because there are international financial interests in the region does not mean that a dictatorship will not either militarily or covertly take over. (00:39:11) I don't see American miners as being an effective buffer zone against Putin. (00:39:18) By the way, what did you learn from talking to the children, Ukrainian children from those regions? (00:39:25) I mean, it's heartbreaking because the only schooling is Russian schooling. (00:39:35) Obviously teaching the Russian language, Putin's view of history, and effectively indoctrination. (00:39:42) And people can quibble with that term, but it's Putin-esque indoctrination schools. (00:39:49) And (00:39:50) any children or families that do not want that effectively have to hide and not go out. (00:39:57) And there were, I spoke to children and parents. (00:40:00) who'd had school friends who, for instance, the Russians set up in 22 and 23 summer camps for the children of some of the areas that have been occupied. (00:40:10) And the children went off to the camps and then they didn't come back. (00:40:14) But they were just stolen. (00:40:16) I mean, it's thought that around 20,000 Ukrainian children have been stolen in this fashion. (00:40:20) That's not a small thing. (00:40:23) It's not got very much attention. (00:40:24) But (00:40:26) Yes, I mean, children who would hide whenever the Russian troops came to the door. (00:40:31) One teenage boy who described to me how when his mother was out, a woman came around the house, knocked on the door, and gave him his papers and said that he had to attend the next week to sign up for the Russian army. (00:40:52) This is, I mean, this is not good. (00:40:56) And that's obviously what life is like for thousands of people behind the Russian lines in Ukraine. (00:41:02) I just have it in mind when people say things like, well, obviously these regions have to be handed over. (00:41:08) It's very, very hard if you're Ukrainian to concede to that. (00:41:13) Yeah, and even if they are as part of the negotiation and hand it over, I think it'll probably be generations or never that could be accepted by Ukrainian people. (00:41:24) Absolutely, and I would have thought never. (00:41:26) What do we know about this kidnapping of children? (00:41:31) The stories of the thousands of children that the Russian forces kidnapped? (00:41:36) Some of them were in orphanages in eastern Ukraine, not all by any means, but some were. (00:41:42) And it's a very complicated story actually, because many children were taken from their families. (00:41:49) Many the Russians said, well, look at these Ukrainians, they don't even look after their children, therefore we will look after them. (00:41:56) And I was recently, when I was there, looking into this story, because it's a very interesting question as to why it hasn't had more attention. (00:42:04) one thinks of, for instance, the abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls some 12 years ago now in northern Nigeria, and the appalling abduction of 300 girls by Boko Haram completely gained the world's attention. (00:42:20) And I was very interested into why the Ukrainian children had been (00:42:24) taken by the Russians have not gained similar attention. (00:42:27) There's A slight similarity with the war in Israel, which I'm sure we'll come on to, but I do think that one reason is that they were effectively hostages and the Ukrainians knew, this is my estimation of the terrain, is that the Ukrainians knew that if they made a great deal about this, was it more than they did, (00:42:50) that the children would effectively be the most effective bargaining chip. (00:42:55) And I do think there's considerable truth in that, because if you look at, for instance, the way in which pressure has been put on the Israeli government by the Israeli population about the kidnapped Israelis, you'll see that it's a pretty effective tactic for any totalitarian regime or terrorist group. (00:43:20) to operate in a way that means that the population of the country you're attacking pressure their government to do something in terms of concession. (00:43:29) It's a very effective tool. (00:43:33) And I think that story was partly played down, not just outside of Ukraine, but also within Ukraine, partly for that reason. (00:43:39) As a truth seeker, as a journalist, (00:43:43) How do you operate in that world where, at least to me, it's obvious that there's just a flood of propaganda on both sides? (00:43:51) Now, of course, when you go there and directly experience it and talk to people, but those people are still also swimming in the propaganda. (00:44:00) So unless you witness stuff directly, sometimes it's hard to know. (00:44:04) Like I speak to people on the Russian side, (00:44:07) And there's, they're clearly, first of all, hilariously enough, they almost always say there's that there's no propaganda in Russia. (00:44:13) Of course. (00:44:16) Which makes me realize, I mean, you can be completely lied to, maybe I am in the United States as well, and just be unaware. (00:44:28) Maybe Earth is run by aliens. (00:44:30) Maybe the Earth is flat. (00:44:31) So I don't know. (00:44:32) Maybe you've taken mushrooms. (00:44:34) I have before this. (00:44:36) And I finally see the truth. (00:44:38) And it's you that are diluted, Douglas. (00:44:42) Okay, but back to our round Earth discussion, round Earth shills that we are. (00:44:47) How do you know what is true? (00:44:49) You can tell it when the bare facts become not true. (00:44:57) you can tell it when somebody is willing to claim that everything caused the invasion of 2022, except for Vladimir Putin invading Ukraine. (00:45:09) Yeah, there's a hilarious thing that happens. (00:45:12) And I think you've actually speak about this, that people are generally just much more willing to criticize the democratically elected leader. (00:45:20) Always, always. (00:45:22) So the interesting thing that happens is these wise sages that do the narratives of like NATO started the war, right? (00:45:30) Which there is some interesting geopolitical depth and truth to that, like that NATO expansion created a complicated geopolitical contact, whatever. (00:45:40) But they forget to say, (00:45:42) other parts of that story. (00:45:44) yes, of course. (00:45:45) I mean, and I mean, of course, to some extent, it's rather, that there's a very, the most irritating type of question asker at any event is the person who says, I was disappointed that in your 30-minute talk you didn't address X. (00:45:58) And I tend to say, looking forward to coming to your next talk where in 30 minutes you'll cover everything that could possibly be covered. (00:46:04) There's always stuff that's going to be left on the sides. (00:46:06) There's always going to be stuff that's left unaddressed. (00:46:08) There's always going to be other angles. (00:46:10) There's always going to be somebody else who has this interesting perspective, and you can't cover it. (00:46:15) Nevertheless, if you cover everything other than the central things, then it's suspicious. (00:46:22) Many years ago, I was at a debate in London, and there was a debate about the origins of World War II, and Pat Buchanan, talking of necromancy, was one of the speakers. (00:46:38) And Andrew Roberts, the historian, was one of the people on the other side. (00:46:45) And at one point, they got so completely stuck into issues of iron ore mining in Poland in the, something like this. (00:46:56) And the moderator, I remember, it was just, it was just a melee. (00:46:58) And the moderator turns to Andrew Roberts and says, Andrew Roberts, why did World War II begin? (00:47:04) And he says, (00:47:05) World War II began because Hitler invaded Poland. (00:47:10) And it was a magnificent moment because everything had been a mush. (00:47:15) They were just so lost in all the intricate and clever and interesting things that you can talk about, the origins of a war, that you forget to mention the thing that's most important. (00:47:28) And certainly my experience, (00:47:32) as a journalist and writer is that one of the reasons why you need to go and see things with your own eyes is because people are certain to tell you that what you've seen with your own eyes didn't happen or hasn't happened. (00:47:47) And it helps to steal you. (00:47:50) for that moment. (00:47:51) It's a gradual thing that happens where the obvious thing starts being taken for granted and people stop saying it because it's like the boring thing to say at a party. (00:48:00) And then all of a sudden, over time, you just almost start questioning whether, you know, like the obvious thing is even true. (00:48:10) I don't know what that, how that happens in human psychology. (00:48:13) I think it does. (00:48:14) I think it does. (00:48:14) I've observed it in a lot of different places. (00:48:17) which is the important thing is the only thing you do forget. (00:48:20) Everything else is what you remember. (00:48:22) And some of us are, for some reason, wired in a way where we don't, we try not to forget the important thing. (00:48:27) Remember the obvious thing, yeah. (00:48:29) Yes. (00:48:30) And as you say, no, I'm not wanting to be the boring guy at the party who reiterates what is true. (00:48:35) Because what a douchebag you'd be if you were that guy. (00:48:38) Nobody likes Captain Obvious at a party. (00:48:41) Okay, is it possible that Donald Trump is a mediator? (00:48:46) a successful negotiator that brings a stable peace to Ukraine? (00:48:51) It's possible. (00:48:52) We'll have to see. (00:48:54) I think it's just too early and complicated to tell. (00:48:59) That he wants to bring a peace seems to me to be obvious. (00:49:01) He's stated it a lot of times. (00:49:06) Whether he can, we're just going to have to see. (00:49:08) It's extremely hard to see some of the parameters of the peace still. (00:49:12) And I would suggest that the most (00:49:14) one, not the most difficult, but one of the most difficult is that there is no peace guarantee on paper that the Ukrainians can possibly believe. (00:49:26) I just it doesn't matter because we've we've we in the West, we some of the countries in the West have said it before that we'd secure their their peace and we haven't. (00:49:39) And so (00:49:41) What other than NATO membership, which is not possible in my view, what other than NATO membership would reassure the Ukrainians that they are going to have their borders secured and the peace of Ukraine secured? (00:49:54) I can't see. (00:49:55) I think there's not going to be ever a guarantee that you can trust. (00:50:01) I think the way you have a guarantee, implicit guarantees by having military and economic partnerships with as many partners as possible. (00:50:11) So you have partnerships with the Middle East, you have partnerships with India, perhaps even with China, with the United States, with many nations in Europe. (00:50:21) All of which still suggests that if there's enough financial interests in Ukraine, they would prevent another Russian invasion. (00:50:31) There would be financial pressure, yeah. (00:50:34) There would be, you know, Russia, (00:50:39) needs to be friends with somebody, either China or the West. (00:50:46) I think a world that's flourishing would have Russia trading and being friends with the West and the East. (00:50:54) Talk would be ideal. (00:50:55) It would be ideal if they if the regime in Moscow wanted it. (00:51:01) But that's that not I mean, again, you get into the thing of (00:51:06) people accused of Russophobia, but I mean, I do believe that after the fall of the wall, Russia was ill-treated by the West, not treated with some of the courtesy that it required. (00:51:22) I do think that. (00:51:24) And at the same time, that doesn't justify the actions of Russia in lust. (00:51:30) 20 years. (00:51:31) Right, but let's descend from the surrealist to the realist. (00:51:35) It's very possible for Russia to be on the verge of military invasion of these nations and that being wrong, while also not doing it because they're afraid to hurt the partnerships with the West and with China. (00:51:53) It's possible, but the alliance they've formed with this sort of rogue alliance with (00:51:59) China to a considerable extent, North Korea not useful, and Iran is something they seem to find bearable. (00:52:11) It's not a very good alliance in most people's analysis, but it's an alliance. (00:52:16) It's bearable, but I don't think, maybe you disagree with this, I don't think the Russian people or even Putin (00:52:25) wants to be isolated from the West. (00:52:27) I think it wants to be friends with the West and with the East and with everybody. (00:52:33) He just also wants Ukraine, right? (00:52:35) And there's, how does the Rolling Stones song go? (00:52:41) Which one? (00:52:44) Not the satisfaction one. (00:52:45) Simply with the devil? (00:52:47) That's the one. (00:52:48) You got me on that one. (00:52:50) No, like there's interests, whether it's expanding the sphere of influence. (00:52:55) That's one thing on the table. (00:52:57) But that can be put aside if you want to maintain the partnerships with these nations. (00:53:02) And if Ukraine has strong economic partnerships with those nations, then that prevents Russia from invading. (00:53:10) I think the premise is (00:53:12) one that I've seen before. (00:53:15) There was a famous, what was his name? (00:53:19) Norman Angell. (00:53:21) He wrote this book, which was a fantastic bestseller in his day, where he believed that Europe would be in a period of endless Kantian peace because the prospect of European powers going to war was so economically unviable. (00:53:37) The book was reissued after World War I. (00:53:41) and I never got the 2nd edition, but I assume it was significantly rewritten. (00:53:46) That's a very kind of cynical take, that just because the book is wrong. (00:53:49) I'm not saying just the book is wrong. (00:53:50) I'm saying that the idea that cooperation on an economic and other levels is any significant preventative device to madness breaking out is not something I see. (00:54:10) could deter some people. (00:54:12) It could deter some very, very rational, economically driven actors, but it fails to take into account all of the other things that motivate people to go to war and to invade and to go mad. (00:54:24) Okay, well, I would argue that in the 21st century, one of the reasons we have much fewer wars is because of the much more, well, so there's few tools here. (00:54:35) on the geopolitical stage. (00:54:37) One of them is that we're just much more interconnected economically, globally interconnected. (00:54:43) And that is always a present pressure on the world to keep peace. (00:54:49) There's a lot of money to be made from peace. (00:54:51) There's also a lot of money to be made from war. (00:54:54) There's a lot of interest attention. (00:54:56) And I'm just presenting one of the tools that a leader should be using. (00:55:01) The alternative is what? (00:55:04) Military force? (00:55:06) That is an interesting one, sometimes a useful one, but unfortunately, it has its downsides also. (00:55:13) And after three years of war and the hundreds of thousands dead, you have to start wondering what are the options on the table. (00:55:22) I agree. (00:55:23) I'm obviously for economic cooperation, but my only caveat is (00:55:30) not to think that is something which is of ultimate interest or even at the top of the list of interests of despots, tyrants, extremists who want something else. (00:55:49) Yeah, but can you read the mind of Vladimir Putin? (00:55:53) No. (00:55:55) A lot of the ideas I hear about peace is (00:56:01) Putin bad, victory must be achieved, NATO membership required. (00:56:08) There's this kind of like, but what's the, you have to come to the table to end the killing is 1, and to have different ideas of how to have a non-zero chance of peace. (00:56:25) So that, you know, the options are, it seems to me the only option (00:56:31) not the only option, but the likeliest option is a lot of strong economic partnerships. (00:56:36) There's, of course, other radical options. (00:56:40) There's Russia joining NATO or something like this, or there's giving, you know, doing, flirting with World War 3, essentially, giving nukes to Ukraine or something like this. (00:56:52) There's like crazy stuff, or a totally new military alliance with France and (00:56:58) and Britain and Germany and European nations and Ukraine, or some weird network of military power that threatens Russia in some way, or maybe some big breakthrough partnership between India, China, and Ukraine, something like this. (00:57:17) Just some really out there ideas. (00:57:19) And I think that's how the world (00:57:21) That's how the world finds a balance and realigns itself in interesting ways. (00:57:27) Look, it could be. (00:57:28) I hope your idea is right. (00:57:33) I think it's about the, well, it's certainly the most peaceful way for this to be resolved. (00:57:40) My only caveat, as I say, is, and also never forget to factor in, that people want different things in this world. (00:57:52) And some people don't dream as you dream. (00:57:56) I think we'll talk about that in your new book, Death Gults. (00:57:59) That one is an easier one for me to understand to the story that you're describing. (00:58:06) I am more hesitant to assign psychopathy to leaders of major nations. (00:58:13) Sure. (00:58:14) Yeah, I'm not by any means urging you to regard Vladimir Putin as a millenarian madman who cannot be (00:58:21) in any way understood? (00:58:24) I think he could be negotiated and reasoned with. (00:58:29) From your lips to God's ears. (00:58:32) Can you steal me on the case for and then against Zelensky as the right leader for Ukraine at this moment? (00:58:37) Is he the right person to take it to the point of peace? (00:58:42) We'll see. (00:58:43) If he can, then of course he is. (00:58:48) he deserves enormous respect for galvanizing his people, for being elected in the 1st place, for galvanizing his nation at a time of incredible peril, for playing the international game of getting support for his country well. (00:59:06) And sometimes the person who does that, not there are many people like that, can be the person who also brings about a peace deal and sometimes not. (00:59:14) I think there's a degree to which (00:59:16) He may have seen too much suffering of the people of the land. (00:59:20) He loves to be able to sit down at a table with a world leader who did the destruction and to be able to compromise on anything. (00:59:35) That's possible. (00:59:37) Again, it puts the onus on him, though. (00:59:39) It sort of slightly presupposes that Putin doesn't have the same human instinct on that. (00:59:46) It is extremely hard. (00:59:47) I've noticed this in a lot of conflicts. (00:59:49) It's extremely hard the way in which outsiders come in and others who haven't seen what you've seen or gone through what you've gone through and say, you know, it's time to get around the negotiating table and just, you know, you think you didn't see what I saw, you didn't go through what I went through. (01:00:08) Who are you to tell me? (01:00:10) Goes back to that thing with the visitor from the land of war and the visitor from the land of peace. (01:00:16) The visitor from the land of peace can easily talk about getting around negotiating tables, but the visitor from the land of war has seen other things. (01:00:27) And it's very hard for somebody who hasn't seen it to tell the person who has that they should act differently. (01:00:39) And the sad thing (01:00:42) about humanity is both the person from the land of peace and the person from the land of war are right. (01:00:49) Yes, that's a struggle. (01:00:52) That's definitely a struggle. (01:00:54) It's like asking somebody to forgive. (01:00:57) I've seen that at a lot of ends of conflicts. (01:01:01) People say, you know, the important thing is that we forgive and move on. (01:01:05) And then the other person says, you know, your child didn't die of shrapnel wounds. (01:01:12) Yeah, this is, I got a lot of heat for an interview I did with Zelensky. (01:01:16) By the way, people privately, the people that message me is all love and support. (01:01:21) And the people that disagree in Ukraine, soldiers, people online are ruthless. (01:01:25) They're misrepresenting me, they're lying. (01:01:27) People online are ruthless and misrepresenting and lying? (01:01:30) Yeah. (01:01:31) Good God, Lex. (01:01:32) You've discovered a new phenomenon. (01:01:36) I'm a real radical intellectual. (01:01:40) Nothing misses your eye. (01:01:43) I see the truth and I'm unafraid to point it out. (01:01:47) No, there's a degree, this idea that you need to compromise with the person, with the leader of a nation you're at war with, and in so doing, to some degree, are forgiving their actions. (01:02:07) Because the actual feeling you have is you want it to be fair. (01:02:11) And the definition of fair when you've seen that much suffering is for him and everybody around him and maybe even all of the people on the other side to just die because you've seen too much suffering. (01:02:24) But the other side of that (01:02:26) is yes, there's children that have died, but you coming to the negotiation table. (01:02:32) We'll stop other children from dying, yes, of course. (01:02:35) And so like there is just, you had this kind of way of speaking about it, embodying that perspective, that it's naive to say to come to the negotiation table. (01:02:45) And it is for a person from the land of war, but the very smart, intelligent, and not naive person from the land of peace that is often right in some deep (01:02:56) sense about the long arc of history, for them it does, it is the right thing to come to the negotiation table to end the more killing. (01:03:05) The one thing I would add to that though is, don't forget that it also depends on whether or not there's a clear shot of winning. (01:03:14) Sure. (01:03:14) If there's a clear shot of winning, and that's the most important, the most important thing in wars is not final negotiations or anything like that, it's simply winning and losing. (01:03:26) And if you have a clear shot of winning and you can take it and you're near it, then having somebody else come in and saying, why not stop just before victory is very hard. (01:03:41) That's one of the complexities, one of the many, many complexities of the conflict we're talking about. (01:03:44) You know what's the other big complexity of that? (01:03:47) Because the clear shot of winning is like a man walking through the desert seeing water. (01:03:52) It could be during war, it really is an illusion. (01:03:56) So here's what happens. (01:03:57) The really complicated aspect of negotiation is in order to negotiate peace from a place of strength, you have to have victory insight. (01:04:11) Yes. (01:04:12) And so the temptation from that position is to not negotiate, is to keep pushing forward to achieve victory. (01:04:20) And this, I would say, (01:04:24) Hindsight is 20-20, but this is the failure in 22 and two occasions to achieve, to negotiate a ceasefire and peace. (01:04:35) One in the spring, because there was a, Ukraine was in a real big, I would say, position of strength, having fended off the Russian forces around Kyiv. (01:04:48) That's one. (01:04:49) And then as you mentioned, in the fall of 22, with Kherson and Kharkiv, had a lot of military success. (01:04:56) They were in a place of strength. (01:04:58) And from that place, they've decided to keep going because victory was insight. (01:05:03) But that was also an opportunity to make peace. (01:05:06) It's perfectly possible, yes. (01:05:08) That's the hard thing. (01:05:08) It's very hard. (01:05:09) It's all hard. (01:05:10) But I'm just, again, it's victory can be won in wars and is often won in wars. (01:05:18) And you're right, they can also grind on because nobody has the capability to make a breakthrough. (01:05:27) It's a case, I mean, the wisdom about civil wars tends to be that they sort of burn out after about 10 years or so for similar reasons. (01:05:38) When you're in the war, can you actually know that a victory can be won? (01:05:42) It's a very good question. (01:05:46) You mean troops on the battlefield or military leaders or political leaders? (01:05:50) Military and political leaders. (01:05:51) It just feels like, I said, man in the desert seeing water. (01:05:55) I think there's a sense that victory is so close. (01:06:01) There are times, there's times in a war when you feel like victory is close. (01:06:05) No, you're right. (01:06:06) And then it slips away. (01:06:08) Yes, it's an interesting insight. (01:06:09) It's like the way in which there's a force in nature, which is that if you amass an army, (01:06:19) amassing it will pull you in to using it. (01:06:24) Yeah. (01:06:25) Extremely hard to amass an army somewhere and then say, let's go back. (01:06:30) Yes, you're right. (01:06:32) No, it's one of many, many interesting aspects to warfare. (01:06:36) I think the sad thing about successful wars, at least in the modern day, is it takes a great (01:06:45) military leader, which I would argue that Zelensky really unified Ukraine in this fight in the beginning of the war. (01:06:55) You have to be that and, like you said, after you amassed the army and had military success, to be able to step back and make peace. (01:07:04) Those two just don't often go hand in hand because, again, as a wartime leader, especially one who has seen the suffering firsthand, (01:07:16) walking away is tough, especially also combined with that, just the realities of war where there is probably corruption, that there is things, once the war ends, there has to be investigations. (01:07:30) Because the war wasn't won, you might not turn out to be, when history looks at it, the good guy. (01:07:37) And a leader doesn't want to, a leader always wants to be the good guy. (01:07:42) So there's just all psychological complexities that are, and you look at this whole picture, in the basic sense, if you want Ukraine to flourish, if you want humanity to flourish, you just ask the question, okay, so what is the thing I would like to see? (01:08:02) There's certainly historical analogies you can give, but just surely not rewarding. (01:08:11) Putin's actions in any way would be a good way to deter him and other dictators from trying to grab land in the future. (01:08:28) So yeah, and but this is nuanced because like you, it's very probably good to be the boring person at the party that says dictatorships are bad, democracies are good. (01:08:41) Many of the ideals of the West are good. (01:08:42) Democracies are better. (01:08:44) Better? (01:08:45) Yes. (01:08:45) Yeah. (01:08:46) That sounds like Animal Farm, but yes, two legs better. (01:08:50) But yes, democracy is better. (01:08:52) And invading countries is bad. (01:08:56) But World War III is bad too. (01:09:00) So after you say something is bad, what's the next step? (01:09:05) Because military intervention in a lot of these conflicts. (01:09:08) It'll be about deterrence. (01:09:10) Yeah, but what's effective deterrence? (01:09:12) That we're going to have to keep going over for a long time to come. (01:09:16) My question is, how can we achieve peace in April, in May, right? (01:09:25) Not like the adults at the table all seem to tell me, well, it's a process, it's complicated, you know, it just feels like this is a thing that might go into the next winter, and they're still, (01:09:40) maybe initial ceasefire and the ceasefire is broken and there's more people dying. (01:09:44) And it's that mess. (01:09:47) It seems like civility and politeness ignores the fact that people are dying every single day. (01:09:53) I mean, of course, like we were all, almost everybody, not everybody, but almost everyone would like the claim to stop immediately. (01:09:59) Of course. (01:10:00) No, like I think that is the boring thing at the party. (01:10:02) Yes, but they don't say it often enough. (01:10:04) Not often. (01:10:05) There has to be a frustration. (01:10:06) There has to be a frustration. (01:10:09) I don't understand why Putin, Zelensky, and Trump can't just meet in a room together without signing anything. (01:10:17) Leaders meeting and discussing and like the human connection. (01:10:21) There's so many layers of diplomats. (01:10:24) It's the problem I have with a managerial class. (01:10:26) I don't, they schedule meetings really well. (01:10:28) They don't get shit done. (01:10:30) And I would love it if people got shit done. (01:10:33) So the soldiers get shit done. (01:10:37) They have, they're fighting the reality of the war. (01:10:40) And then the leaders have the capacity to get shit done on the scale of nations and geopolitics. (01:10:46) But like this diplomatic meetings and... (01:10:49) No, I agree. (01:10:50) Look, I share your frustration about it. (01:10:51) At the same time, I think, I share your frustration because I've seen it all, a lot of it, you know, in my own eyes. (01:10:59) I mean, there was a... (01:11:01) Battan and I was with the other week and they were hit just after I left their base and you wouldn't believe what a thermobaric bomb can do to the human body. (01:11:13) And I share your frustration with that. (01:11:16) At the same time, one of the things that happens if you are rushing is that you do, and I've seen this elsewhere, you will put pressure on the people you can pressurize. (01:11:31) and you will not put enough pressure on the people you can't pressurize. (01:11:35) And that is one of the worrying things that could happen with this. (01:11:41) Simply, you can put, America can put extraordinary diplomatic, financial, intelligence, military pressure on Ukraine. (01:11:56) And (01:11:57) It can put significant pressure on Putin, but it's much easier to pressure Zelensky. (01:12:04) And that's one of the many things that makes it harder, is that the temptation to rush for peace, accepting that peace is the most desirable thing, and accepting the horrors of war, which, you know, we can linger on, but you... (01:12:18) Accepting all that, if somebody says, we've got to get peace today, and the three of them around a table, the most likely thing is that it'll be the person who you can pressure most easily, who will be the person that you pressure, and as a result, have an outcome which, yes, might stop the killing as soon as possible, but might also set up a situation which rewards the aggressor and effectively punishes the victim. (01:12:45) And that's an extremely (01:12:48) ugly and common thing to happen. (01:12:50) Yeah, and that's the other boring thing to say. (01:12:53) The boring truth that the easy shortcut here is to punish Ukraine. (01:13:00) And you just have to not do it. (01:13:03) Let's keep being the boring people at the party. (01:13:05) Yeah, well, nobody's going to invite us. (01:13:10) All right, let's go from one complicated conflict. (01:13:17) to perhaps an even more complicated one, Israel and Palestine. (01:13:29) Can you take me through what happened on October 7th, as you understand it, and as you outline at the beginning of the book? (01:13:37) Well, the book on Democracies and Death Cults is a mixture of first-hand reporting and observation interviews, and (01:13:46) a wider reflection, not just on the war that's been going on since the 7th of October, but the war's been going on a lot longer. (01:13:54) And also, I suppose, on what for me is one of the overwhelming questions, which I'm sure we'll get to, which is the reaction in the rest of the world. (01:14:03) Obviously, on the 7th itself, it was a brigade-sized attack on Israel from Gaza, Hamas, (01:14:13) broke through the security fence and attacked all the softest targets they could. (01:14:22) They swiftly overwhelmed things like the observation base in Nahal Oz. (01:14:28) They ran through the communities in the south, very peaceful, peaceneck effective communities of the kibbutzim, as they're called, the communities. (01:14:40) and murdered and raped and burned and kidnapped. (01:14:44) And of course, they, from their point of view, had the great good fortune of also coming across hundreds of young people dancing in the early hours of the morning at a dance party and rampaged through that with RPGs and Kalashnikovs and grenades and hammers and more and got within, well, 20 kilometers into Israel. (01:15:11) places like Afakim and Sterot, important towns, and carried out their massacres there as well. (01:15:18) We now know that the plan was that Hezbollah did the same thing from the north. (01:15:25) Hezbollah joined in the war within 24 hours by starting firing rockets again in very large numbers into northern Israel from southern Lebanon. (01:15:34) But the plan was that they would do the same thing from the north and carry out similar massacres there and effectively be able to meet in the middle and garage Israel from the center. (01:15:45) The interesting reason why I think it'll be found out in the future, but why they didn't coordinate better was Hamas didn't trust any line of communication to Hezbollah to let them know exactly when they were going to do it that wouldn't be intercepted. (01:16:00) The Iranian revolutionary government in Tehran, which obviously funds Hamas and Hezbollah and trains and arms, knew of the plan. (01:16:08) It was a very successful attempt to annihilate the state, but they didn't get close to that, but they got worryingly closer than people might have thought they were capable of. (01:16:21) I think from the Israeli side, it was obviously one of the most, if not the most catastrophic (01:16:27) intelligence and military failure since the foundation of the state. (01:16:31) And I think there are several reasons why. (01:16:35) One is a perception problem. (01:16:38) What a lot of military commanders and others describe to me as a conception, the conception that had prevailed in Israel for some years in the security and military establishment was that Hamas were content with being corrupt and governing Gaza and, you know, (01:16:58) lining their pockets and living in Qatar and becoming billionaires, but that like many other terrorist groups and cults, that they would end up becoming just corrupt and not losing their ideology, but the ideology becomes secondary. (01:17:20) That's the first thing, was there was just a massive error of the conception in Israel. (01:17:27) And then there are the multiple manifold security and military failures of the day and leading up to the day. (01:17:37) And there already have been quite a lot of people held to account for that, and there doubtless will be in the future as well. (01:17:45) The single thing I heard, which I heard most and which was most distressing in a way, (01:17:55) was the number of people who described to me, who survived the massacres in the south, who said that, they'd said to their children, don't worry, the army will be here in minutes, and they weren't. (01:18:08) In many places it was many hours till the army got there. (01:18:15) And there are reasons for that. (01:18:17) There are some reasons that will be military failings, leadership failings. (01:18:24) Other things were very, I discovered, were very human failings. (01:18:29) I don't want to overstress the failure of the army because actually certain units and things got down very fast. (01:18:36) There was a unit of Divan who got down to the junction by within about an hour and 90 minutes of the massacres starting and joined in the fight. (01:18:47) And then there were self-starters who I write about in the book, extraordinary people who just (01:18:51) I broke orders and just realized the magnitude of what was happening and said, we're needed in the south, go. (01:18:58) And fought very hard for hours, days, in some cases. (01:19:04) But the complexities on the ground were unbelievable. (01:19:07) I mean, as usually happens in warfare, but what they call the fog of war is a very real thing. (01:19:14) You know what it's, you can see it in hindsight, but you can't see when you're in it. (01:19:20) And one of the things that made it very complicated was, for instance, Hamas coming in, taking uniforms off dead Israelis, wearing them, coming in with Israeli-style apparatus on them. (01:19:41) There's a Muslim doctor I quote in the book I interviewed who (01:19:45) describes how he was going to his, he's an Israeli Muslim Arab and he was going to, he's a doctor, he was going to his shift at the hospital at 6.30 in the morning. (01:19:55) The rockets start coming in because the rockets started first and then the full invasion.