Running theory-derived consciousness indicators through frontier LLM judges yields a roughly 30% implied probability of consciousness-relevant features in a frontier LLM, compared to about 46-47% for a bee.

5:10but they're good. Like it's like the best neuroscience has basically been able to do. You're aggregating across a bunch of different theories. There's a nice diversity there and you get like really tight numbers across. So we have the best Gemini model, the best claw model and the best open AI model and they all like basically agree uh they agree 100% on the ordering of systems. So we do biological and artificial

5:30systems and they sort of move around in in terms of absolute scale but they but in general yeah they they rank these systems pretty coherently and the reasoning is as you might expect pretty intelligent and uh anyway I mean one punch line from that is the sort of implied probability of consciousness in something like a frontier LLM according to these systems is on the order of 30%.

5:50Or the extent to which those systems realize properties related to consciousness is like 30%. To compare this to like a biological system, the lowest one that we tested was something like a B, which is already fairly sophisticated, and it gets something like 46 47%. Really interestingly, when you when we test frontier LLM in an agentic harness, so this is like basically claude code or codeex and we

6:12just describe architecturally what this is. You're in an environment, you can affect that environment. uh you know it's a it's a very special kind of environment but yeah you can make long-running changes to your to your codebase or your project or whatever because there are theories of consciousness that privilege agency and embodiment uh and this like increases the system's ability to do both of those things these numbers like shoot up and

6:32you get numbers as high as like 40 to 45% sort of right on the tail of the uh the biological creatures and so anyway I mean we can I can also this is really winging it but I could show you sort of an early version of where this uh where this plot looks. So you can like see all the all the numbers here. But just this is I I I can't not bring this up when

6:52you're asking me about like probability ranges of consciousness for various systems. Like we're really trying to get non-handwavy numbers so that we can start arguing about those numbers rather than just arguing about like philosophy that we've been arguing about for thousands of years to no avail. >> But behavior can't settle this in either direction. These models are trained to imitate human data. So whatever they say about their own experience is shaped by