Computation is a mathematical formalism, not a concrete physical system, so it cannot itself possess causal powers — only the physical systems that implement a computation can be causes.
Chirimuuta argues computation and causation belong to different ontological categories: only concrete physical systems have causal powers, so computation per se cannot explain cognition without further justification. ✦ AI generated
Mazviita Chirimuuta · Machine Learning Street Talk · 2026-01-23 · original ↗
starts at this moment · 37:27
“so so what about this idea of whether computation itself has causal powers”
computation itself is mathematical formalism, it's like exists, it's uh it is a mathematical structure. Things that have causal powers are concrete physical systems. So I just think they're different kinds of things.
verbatim transcript · starts at 37:27
37:27mathematical structure. Things that have causal powers are concrete physical systems. So I just think they're different kinds of things. >> So So S famously argued that you know um the the reason why we can't build strong AI AI is that computation doesn't have causal powers. It's implemented in in silicone. So what does have causal powers are the machines that actually implement the computation. But but couldn't you sort of say, well, there is
37:54still a causal graph. Perhaps you you would argue that computation isn't a node in that causal graph. It's just some kind of an aspect of it. >> Yeah. I mean, I think it just goes back to this issue like computation in and of itself is not the kind of thing that could have causal powers. I I think I think Soul's point, and this is in the rediscovery of mind on this, was an
38:18interesting one. It was kind of maybe of kind of subtle and it kind of gets lost in the wash of like AI back and forth and um soul bashing which happens a lot but um it was about the kinds of ways that we form explanation in the sciences and he what his point was that cognition if it's anything is something as part of the [snorts] physical realm the realm of
38:45causation. The assumption of the computational theory of mind and he argues that this is very dominant within cognitive science is that you can explain this phenomenon which is a phenomenon of the concrete physical world through this non-causal thing which is computation and suddenly there's no gap that needs to be closed and I and I think that's that's a fair point is that there's something inherently um that needs like further justification
39:18of why of all of the things that happen in the concrete physical world that demand explanation, why we reach out outside of the concrete realm of physical causation into computation in order to explain this thing cognition. >> Another argument S was making was you know how machines couldn't understand. Yeah. >> And of course he was talking about things like semantics. >> Yeah. >> Do do you feel that they could
- ·Computation is a mathematical formalism, not a physical system
- ·Only concrete physical systems possess causal powers
- ·Computation and causation belong to different ontological categories
- ·Computation alone cannot explain cognition
- ·Causal work is done by the implementing physical system
- ·Invoking computation as a cause requires separate justification