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Video · 2026-07-27 · 1h 15m · 6 moments

Ad expert reveals the most common blunders in marketing

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01
Mechanism

An invention isn't an innovation until it changes behavior.

Sutherland argues that Watt and Boulton succeeded with the steam engine not through superior engineering but through marketing psychology—inventing the horsepower unit as a customer-friendly metric and pioneering a hardware-as-a-service pricing model that aligned incentives.

transcript

Rory Sutherland: And my argument is that an invention isn't an innovation until it changes behavior. I think it's Stuart Butterfield of Slack who says something very similar. No, the only real measure of the effect you're having on innovation is the extent to which you change behavior. And you can invent anything you like, but if you can't get anybody to adopt it, it's an invention, but it's not an innovation. And what was selling steam engines to mine owners? And the purpose of the steam engine was to replace the horses they used to walk round and round in circles draining the mines so that miners could go in and effectively mine coal slate coal whatever without drowning. What he realized is that you could you as an engineer you could talk around you know the calorific capacity of the boiler or the length of the piston stroke or whatever and these people didn't want to know. So Watson and Bolton amongst themselves said, 'Well, what do these people really want to know before they're prepared to buy a steam engine?' They said, 'They want to know how many horses they no longer need to feed if they buy a steam engine. How many horses can I get rid of if I buy the steam engine?' So what went out and invented a unit we still use today, which is called the horsepower. And the reason it's not named after a famous scientist like the M or the Newton or the Koulom or the Watt for that matter or Celsius or anything of that kind is because it's a marketing unit. It was invented for marketing purposes because he could then go and say if you buy 25 horsepower steam engine you can actually get rid of 75 horses cuz I think the horses worked in shift. So it does the work of 25 horses but it does it 24 hours a day. So you can now get rid of of 75 horses. And these people would go scribble, scribble, scribble, scribble, scribble. Cost of horses, cost of feeding horses, cost of looking after horses. And you know, on the back of an envelope, they could then go, we'll have two of those. By the way, it went even further than that. I mean, the industrial revolution was a marketing revolution every bit as much as it was an industrial revolution because there was no point in being able to produce things in abundance if you couldn't create corresponding demand. So, you know, one of the things about the 18th and 19th century in England was it was an absolutely pioneering period in terms of how people marketed things and that included the steam engine where what and Bolton would go to a mine owner. Now, let me get this right. Some people were already using Nukeman engines which were less efficient steam engines than the Watt engine. and Watt and Bolton would go along to the people who are already using these inefficient steam engines and this is how they priced their their own steam engine. They said, 'We'll supply it for free. You pay us a third of the money you save on coal.' So it was literally hardware as a service. Bear in mind this was 1775. I mean years later Rolls-Royce started charging airlines for jet engines in the same way. Effectively, you pay us for every hour the engine is in service. Now what was ingenious about that was of course it aligned the interests of the people selling the steam engines and the people owning the mines because the people in the country where coal was most expensive most needed to make m to save money on coal that was Cornwall t where there were tin mines quite a long way away from any available coal field. So coal was more expensive there. And so the first Watt engines tended to be installed in places where coal was most expensive which meant the mine owners saved more money and Watt and Bolton made more money. So they were actually capturing the upside.

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02
Claim

Making things desirable is often more effective and cheaper than improving the things themselves, because the laws of psychology are malleable while the laws of physics are not.

Using electric car range anxiety as a case study, Sutherland shows that trillions of dollars are spent on engineering fixes (bigger batteries) when a psychological reframe could solve the problem more cheaply—using his personal experience of panicking at 16% battery despite having 58 miles of range, while happily driving his wife's car at 56% with only 56 miles of range.

transcript

Rory Sutherland: I make the same point about electric cars, which is you have this thing called range anxiety, and we're spending billions and billions of dollars a year trying to produce batteries with a higher energy density. It's a really good thing. I'm not I'm not saying, 'Hey, engineers, you're wasting your time.' But isn't it cheaper just to reduce anxiety rather than to increase range? Because if the way to reduce range anxiety is always to increase range, we'll end up with electric cars being heavier than they need to be, more expensive than they need to be, and you know, with 50 kwatt hours sitting outside your house 95% of the time effectively doing nothing. So reducing anxiety and I realized by the way how irrational this is and I explain the story which is it it fascinates me because one of the things I think that helps if you want to do this is to have some degree of metacognition. which is you don't just think, you think about your own thinking. It's apparently true of fighter pilots. The really good fighter pilots have good cognitive skills, but they also have good metacognitive skills. They don't just go, I'm going to do that instinctively, but they also ask, 'Is there a reason why I shouldn't be doing that in this instance?' Okay? Or this time it's different, as it were. And so my wife's car is a Mini Kooper electric and it's got about I I guess it's about uh 28 30 kWh battery and a range of about 100 miles. And I've got the Lotus Electray which is 112 kWh battery, a range of about 300 miles. And I got back from quite a lot of driving. I've been down to Wales and back and the car's down to 16%. Okay. And I'm going and all the lights have gone amber because it's at 16%. And I'm get I'm I'm going white knuckle on this. I'm going god I'm down to I'm 16%. Oh my goodness. I was down to 16%. Then I look at the actual range and it's about 58 miles. Now my wife's car that's 56%. Okay. In my wife's car we drive around at 56% i.e. with a range of 56 miles all the time without the slightest smidgen of anxiety. But when that's expressed as 16% not 56 miles, okay, I'm suddenly having conions and really panicking. Now, what that suggests is that range anxiety is much more a factor of psychology than it is of physics. And the problem with trying to increase battery range is that laws of physics are actually kind of set in stone to a large part. Okay? There's not much you can do about the laws of physics. Whereas the laws of psychology are magnificently malleable. And so that's the thing that really interests me because we spend a lot of time effectively trying to uh work within the laws of physics which are immutable when it would be a lot easier just to say actually you know why don't we why don't we take this undesirable thing and make it cool right?

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03
Mechanism

Instead of benchmarking against competitors on the same metrics, find the metric everyone has neglected and dominate that.

Sutherland introduces 'reverse benchmarking'—identifying what competitors have ignored and doing that spectacularly well, illustrated by Will Guidara's restaurant focusing on coffee and beer service instead of copying the world's best restaurant, and Buc-ee's making women's restrooms sensational rather than merely adequate.

transcript

Rory Sutherland: I call this reverse benchmarking. In other words, you look at all the metrics that everybody cares about in the category. You find a metric that's been completely and ridiculously neglected and you double down on that thing. Now I first came across this in Will Gdara's fantastic book, Unreasonable Hospitality. He goes to the number one restaurant in the world. All of his team say, 'We ought to copy this. We ought to do that thing with the napkins. I really like what they do in the bathrooms with the scented jawsticks. Let's copy that.' And Gdara goes, 'Not going to copy any of that.' Because two, one, we can't afford to. And two, they're already doing it. What I want to know from you is what out of this evening at the world's best restaurant, a Michelangar restaurant somewhere. What was a bit disappointing? What was a bit me? And they said the coffee was a bit average, you know, it was nothing special. and the beer drinkers, probably the chefs who'd gone along, got treated really crappily, shabily compared to the wine drinkers. So he goes back to his own restaurant and he appoints a coffee sleier and a beer sumelier. And he says, 'Your job is not just to benchmark against these people, it's to hit it out of the park.' Now, if you think about it, taking something that's bad about the category, not not saying we need to raise our level to the category average, but instead doing it spectacularly well, something that nobody's expecting.

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04
Claim

Pushing accountability downward in organizations creates risk aversion that kills innovation, because individual managers fear losing their jobs if a risky bet fails, even when the odds are hugely favorable in aggregate.

Sutherland recounts Richard Thaler's experiment where 6 of 8 division heads rejected a bet with 50% chance of 50% profit increase and only 20% chance of 30% loss—because they'd lose their jobs if it failed. The CEO wanted them all to take it, but individually they couldn't. This structural misalignment kills marketing and innovation, which are fat-tailed activities where you can't predict which 10% will produce the value.

transcript

Rory Sutherland: Richard Thaylor the Nobel prizewinning economist and behavioral economist the author of Nudge. He once spoke to a board of about 10 people very large company. And he goes to the eight heads of the largest divisions of this company and he asks them all simultaneously a question. Would you take a decision if it had a 50% chance of increasing your profits next year by 50% and a 20% chance of reducing your profits by 30%. And six out of the eight of them said no. And Thaylor goes back and says well you know you're all good enough mathematicians I assume to realize these are highly favorable odds. to a gambling man, you know, this is a very very good bet and yet you declined to take part. Why is that? And they reply six out of the eight of them uh because uh 20% of the time or 30% of time I'd lose my job. And then the interesting thing happens which is the chief executive is sitting at the end of the table and looks a gasast at the eight people and goes but I want all of you to take those odds because net net in aggregate we'd almost certainly end up massively better off. Yes, two divisions, one division might have a slightly disappointing year but four of them would perform spectacularly. And you realize that the way that businesses are structured, as you push responsibility and accountability further and further down the organization, they become more and more risk averse and they become more and more uncertainty adverse. So they would prefer a definite 5 to 10% to a probabilistic a 50% chance of 50%. And what happens then is that you fundamentally you become highly conservative. You're more worried about downside avoidance than you are upside opportunity. And as a result, obviously both innovation and marketing, I would argue, are fat tailed activities where 10% of what you do is probably more valuable than everything else. You know, you can't tell in advance which 10% it's going to be. They are processes of exploration and discovery. And what you do is you get rid of the discovery layer in the pursuit of efficiency. And in the short term it looks like a great idea but in the longer term it's it it proves fatal I think because you've lost the capacity to adapt to reinvent to reposition in pursuit of the occasional um the occasional breakthrough.

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05
Data

How customers order a product can matter more than what the product is or how much it costs, because small psychological bottlenecks can doom an otherwise sound offering.

Sutherland shares a direct response experiment for phone company star services: postal-only got 5% response, phone-only got 2%, but offering a choice of post or phone yielded 7%. The way people could order mattered more than the product features or price, revealing a psychological bottleneck that rational investment in the product would never have addressed.

transcript

Rory Sutherland: I'll give you an example. This is it's something like 1991, 1992, and I'm working on direct response advertising for the phone company. And we simply um were offering people the chance to pay a couple of pounds a month extra to receive what what we call star services I think in the United States network services which is you could have call diversion you could have call waiting on your phone and you could have something else wake up call or something like that and and if you've paid a certain amount monthly these facilities were added to your home phone line and we wrote people letters and it said either send back the pre- lasered coupon below in the in the postage paid envelope or call this number and quote this code. We gave them a choice of post or phone. And we had a slightly bonkers client who didn't want to offer the postal response. I don't know why. I have no idea why to this day. Okay. And so we said, well, let's test it. um let let's not just get rid of a coupon response because that's dangerous because you know if you know if you don't test this rigorously you could end up effectively damaging your business quite significantly on a whim. And so we tested three kinds of letters, 50,000 people each, randomized, completely randomized selection as with the newspapers. And one lot got postal only, one lot got phone only, and one lot as before got the choice of phone or post. Post only 5% response rate. Phone only 2% response rate. When you offer people a choice, it was just it was 7%. not quite but almost nearly I think the sum total of the of the two independent response rates that that may not surprise strike you as all that weird but to an economist this would be completely baffling because it would suggest that the more important factor affecting whether you bought the product was not what the product was or how much it cost but how you were able to actually order it. And from that moment on I remember thinking okay this is extraordinary because every now and then there are almost certainly brilliant businesses which are failing because they've failed to unblock some sort of psychological bottleneck. At this case, the psychological bottleneck might have been that, you know, all you know, people just hated using the phone to order something. And you could have rationally spent millions and millions and millions of pounds trying to improve the product or to spend ages demonstrating what a great product it was. And yet, if you fail at one psychological hurdle, you can doom yourself.

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06
Example

Making trade-offs explicit so customers choose them in advance is far better than cutting costs and imposing the outcome on them without their knowledge.

Sutherland uses Flat White or Off coffee (pre-made flat whites, no customization, priced at £4, for high-volume train stations), Moxy hotels (tiny rooms, no room service, but great bar and Wi-Fi for short stays), and the Slate truck ($25,000 electric pickup with no frills) as examples of brands that explicitly state the trade-off up front. Customers are happy to accept less in one dimension when they choose it, rather than having it imposed.

transcript

Rory Sutherland: The point about flat white or off is it's highquality coffee, not crappy filter coffee that you can produce at scale by simply reducing the customization level. Now, here's where it gets interesting. Henry Ford was a brilliant marketer. Why did he say you could have every any color as long as it's black? Because at the time, paint dried at differing speeds depending on the color. And therefore, if you had a variety of paint colors on the Ford production line, it completely messed up the flow of the production line because some cars would take longer to dry than others. And it turned out that black was the fastest drying color. So, they basically imposed black on the whole Ford fleet. So, it's absolutely fine not to give people something to ask people to make a tradeoff so long as you make them aware of the trade-off in advance. Okay, that's why it's called flat white or off. It doesn't you if you turned up at a branch of Starbucks and they said we we only serve flat whites, right? You go, 'What the hell are you talking about?' No, no, I want a Frappuccino with, you know, almond milk and blah blah blah. No, no. Okay. No, you can't have that. It's, you know, now the reason it's called flat white or off is it makes explicit the tradeoff before someone turns up. So you said if anybody the joke is if anybody turns up and asks for a cappuccino, you point at the logo and you say the answer's in the name. Right now there's an example of this which always fascinates me. Are you a fan of the Moxy hotel chain? ... So it's quite interesting because the rooms are tiny. There's no room service. There's no laundry. Okay. But the ground floor is kind of a bit like a well a solvent we work, right? Okay. And there's a 24-hour barista. There's a you there's a um uh usually there's someone making really quite good cocktails. You check in at the bar. You don't check in at the check-in desk. There isn't a concage. None of that bollocks. Okay? Don't go stay there on your honeymoon. Don't go stay there for a week. But if you've got one or two nights to stay in a place, it's exactly what you want. Okay? It's small room, very good TV, very good Wi-Fi. The other great advantage is after you've checked out in the morning and had breakfast, to be honest, you can hang out there for another 5 hours if you want to, you know, whereas if you tried doing that in a conventional hotel, you'd you'd feel a bit unwanted. It's a it's it's basically a brilliant brilliant explicit trade-off. And they always said when I spoke to them, they said basically 90% of our customers love this. And the reason they love us is either because they've stayed before, they understand the trade-off, and they buy into it. Or else they know about how the moxy works, and they get the deal, and they've decided in advance, that's the trade-off I want. 10% of their customers are expecting the Marriott, and they're pissed off as hell. And it's a classic example of actually, you know, expectation minus reality, you know, is the formula that matters. You can provide less of something so long as you don't actually disappoint.

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Highlight slides
Invention ≠ Innovation✦ from: An invention isn't an innovation until it changes behavior.Horsepower: A Marketing Unit✦ from: An invention isn't an innovation until it changes behavior.Hardware-as-a-Service in 1775✦ from: An invention isn't an innovation until it changes behavior.Psychology Is Cheaper Than Physics✦ from: Making things desirable is often more effective and cheaper than improving the things themselves, because the laws of psychology are malleable while the laws of physics are not.The Range Anxiety Paradox✦ from: Making things desirable is often more effective and cheaper than improving the things themselves, because the laws of psychology are malleable while the laws of physics are not.The Hidden Cost of Engineering-Only Thinking✦ from: Making things desirable is often more effective and cheaper than improving the things themselves, because the laws of psychology are malleable while the laws of physics are not.The Accountability Paradox✦ from: Pushing accountability downward in organizations creates risk aversion that kills innovation, because individual managers fear losing their jobs if a risky bet fails, even when the odds are hugely favorable in aggregate.Thaler's Boardroom Bet✦ from: Pushing accountability downward in organizations creates risk aversion that kills innovation, because individual managers fear losing their jobs if a risky bet fails, even when the odds are hugely favorable in aggregate.Fat-Tailed Innovation✦ from: Pushing accountability downward in organizations creates risk aversion that kills innovation, because individual managers fear losing their jobs if a risky bet fails, even when the odds are hugely favorable in aggregate.
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