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Audio · 2026-06-30 · 6 moments

#498 – Anthony Kaldellis: Roman Empire, Byzantine Empire, Rise & Fall of Empires

Anthony Kaldellis is a historian of the Roman Empire and author of “The New Roman Empire”, a comprehensive history of the Byzantine Empire (Eastern Roman Empire). Thank you for listening ❤ Check out our sponsors: https://lexfridman.com/sponsors/ep498-sc See below for timestamps, transcript, and to give feedback, submit questions, contact Lex, etc. Transcript: https://lexfridman.com/anthony-kaldellis-transcript CONTACT LEX: Feedback – give feedback to Lex: https://lexfridman.com/survey AMA ✦ AI generated

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01
Claim

The Byzantine Empire was the Roman Empire — calling it 'Byzantine' is an invention of historians long after the empire collapsed, and the people of that time always considered themselves Romans.

Kaldellis argues that the burden of proof is on those who claim the Byzantine Empire was something other than Roman. The Eastern Roman Empire called itself Roman, its subjects were Roman citizens, and the term 'Byzantine' was a Western European invention for political reasons.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: So, Lex, the burden of proof is on those who would assert that what we've been calling the Byzantine Empire is something other than the Roman Empire, because all of our sources are very clear about this. And we've known about this. We've always known about it. It's almost a form of cognitive dissonance, right? It's like when you know something is the case, but you carry on as if it's not. So the Eastern Roman Empire, this is the direct continuation of the ancient Roman Empire in the East, right? Everybody knows the Western Empire fell in the 5th century. And for many conceptions of Western history, that was sufficient. Like that's when we just called it the Roman Empire fell in the 5th century. And we kind of, yeah, we kind of know that the Eastern half survived, but we don't want to include that in our cultural genealogy. And so we kind of pretend that it became something else. But in fact, it called itself the Roman Empire. Its subjects were Roman citizens. They called themselves Romans all the way down through to the end and beyond.

02
Context

The Roman Empire's three great crisis points — the Arab conquests of the 630s, the Seljuk Turk conquest of Asia Minor in the 1070s, and the Fourth Crusade in 1204 — were devastatingly swift, while most of its history was one of slow, steady growth.

Kaldellis identifies three swift, catastrophic defeats that defined the empire's trajectory, while noting that the vast majority of its history was a period of slow, steady economic and territorial growth.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: I would say if you wanted to produce a sort of very swift timeline of its history, it's obviously important to focus on the moments when lots of territory was lost to foreign invaders. And these are actually 3 main moments. There's the Arab conquests in the 630s. This is a decade. In a decade, that war was lost. It is the Seljuk Turk conquest of Asia Minor, modern Turkey, in the 1070s. And that was very swift and partly reversed afterwards, but only partly. And then there's the Fourth Crusade, 1204, when the armies from mostly France sack, conquer Constantinople, and dismember the empire as much as they could. It didn't last that long. The Romans managed to regroup and recover. But those are the three main crisis points. They are very swift, but they cause incredible damage. For all the rest of its history, it is a state and society that is generally consolidating, regrouping, and generally engaged in slow but steady economic growth, territorial expansion, a small scale but steady.

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03
Definition

Roman history is the history of a political community, not a culture or religion — it coheres through the narrative of the Roman people, like the Ship of Theseus, where gradual change never felt like a rupture to those living through it.

Kaldellis explains that unlike Greek culture or Christianity, Roman history is the history of a specific state and political community. Changes were so gradual that no one living through them perceived a rupture in Roman identity.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: Roman history is different from, let's say, Greek history or Christian history, right? Christian history is the story of a religion. It can be in any country among any ethnic group. It's here, there, right? It's everywhere. But you still have histories of Christianity. It's the same with like, say, Greek culture or your Greek literature, right? It's not a function of a particular state, ancient Greeks were famously never united in a state, but it's people who culturally accept that tradition as their kind of elite prestige culture and engage with Homer and Plato and so forth. And they can be anywhere. Roman history is not like that. Roman history is very specifically the history of a state or a political community. And so this is the community of the Roman people, the Roman citizens. And it is in gradual evolution, but at no point is there a rupture in that history such that its members would ever think that something dramatic had changed and that they're no longer part of that story. So in the same way as the ship I just mentioned, in other words, it's the narrative that you tell about it where the changes that take place to it make sense only when you see them within the context of that story.

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04
Mechanism

The emperor's persona — projecting tireless, sleepless, responsive, and accountable governance — was a consistent and sincere mechanism for securing the consent of the governed to pay taxes and accept rule.

Kaldellis describes the persona the Roman imperial government broadcast through laws, rhetoric, and petitions: that emperors were sleepless, hardworking, accountable, and existed solely for the benefit of their subjects. He argues this was largely sincere, not merely propaganda.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: This persona, it's what the governments or the emperor, the court, and the spokesman, the bureaucracy want their subjects to think this whole thing is about. Like how is power being used, why and for whom, right? And they do so in laws that they promulgate throughout the empire. Sometimes they have these laws read in church, for example, or posted publicly. They're definitely eager to have them communicated to as many people as possible. But they're also a function of imperial rhetoric... Basically, that the authorities are responsive to the needs of their subjects, that they are often accountable. In other words, they understand that they are exercising public power and that their mandate is to exercise it solely for the benefit of their subjects. They keep saying this. So renouncing any kind of private interest. In other words, we're not doing this for our benefit, say the authorities. We're doing this for your benefit. Also that they're proactive. So the emperors are constantly saying that we're planning ahead. We're trying to foresee what problems you might have, and we are solving them before you experience them. And that they are also working very hard. So hardworking, in fact, one of the cliches that they keep using is sleepless. The emperors keep saying that I'm losing sleep over this. I'm not sleeping at night because I'm just worrying so much about your problems and how to solve them. Justinian, for example, was publicly known as the sleepless emperor.

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05
Mechanism

The Roman Empire had no right to the throne — 46% of emperors were overthrown through violence, creating a perpetual referendum where emperors governed well to avoid being deposed.

Kaldellis explains that because there was no legitimate right to the throne, roughly 46% of emperors in Constantinople were overthrown through violence. This insecurity forced emperors to govern well and maintain popular support as a survival strategy, creating what he calls a 'perpetual referendum.'

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: A number of things, but ultimately it is that there is no right to the throne. And this is a function of the Roman matrix of politics here, in other words. So here's a bit of a paradox. What we call the Roman Republic was the most imperialistic phase of Roman history. This is when the Romans did most of their conquering. What we call the empire is much less imperialistic in this way. That's much more defensive in its approach, right? And yet our terms are a little mismatched in that way. The empire is more a function of the that it has an emperor rather than it is engaged in imperialism. And that emperor emerged out of the republic, but emerged out of the republic in a very strange way. In other words, not as a dynasty that created the state. So for example, if you think of the Ottoman Empire, many other empires, the whole thing existed because this dynasty engaged in conquest and was successful in creating the state. And so the dynasty was like at the heart of the state. But it's not at all the case in the Roman Empire. The emperor is a figure who emerged within a republic... Something like 46% of the emperors of Constantinople are overthrown through violence. 46%. That's almost half. So that's a huge number, which means that every emperor is vulnerable and insecure, and they know it. So what they have to do is make sure that doesn't happen to them. And the way to do that is not by arresting and executing everybody you think might be a threat or just generally behaving like a Caligula or Nero. That will just get you killed. Like they know this. So the best way to avoid that fate is to actually do the things that will make people happy so that they don't support a rebel if a rebel decides to appear.

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06
Example

The Hippodrome of Constantinople functioned as a venue for a perpetual popular referendum, where emperors could test public opinion and were sometimes forced to reverse policy in response to crowd reactions.

Kaldellis describes the Hippodrome as a political venue where the people gathered to cheer, boo, or demand policy changes. He gives the example of Emperor Alexios III in the 1190s, who proposed a 'German tax' and immediately backtracked when the crowd erupted in opposition.

transcript

Anthony Kaldellis: In the 1190s, the emperor, Alexius III, he's being threatened by the German emperor. German emperor is basically, you pay me a bunch of money or I'll invade. Just straight up extortion. And Alexios decides, okay, I'm going to gather this money. I'm going to impose these taxes. And he gathers the people in the Hippodrome. And he says, you know, we're going to have the German tax. He called it the German tax. And there's such an uproar in the Hippodrome against this that he was like, that wasn't my idea. I don't know where that came from. No, never mind. We're not going to have the German tax. Unfortunately, the German emperor died and nothing ever happened. But it gives you a sense of how emperors like literally can backtrack when they see that the people are against something in a matter of policy, right? Like tax policy. So yeah, there was this give and take. So institutionally, the emperor might look absolute as you called him earlier. In practice, no.

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