ATRIUMsearch → argument graph
Audio · 2026-06-03 · 30m · 11 moments

Bill Ackman: Investment Strategy, What the Market is Missing, How AI Breaks Businesses

(0:00) Bill Ackman joins the show! (0:30) Evolving investment philosophy: What's changed over 20 years? (4:40) AI: Greatest time to build a business, and a major threat to portfolios (7:50) Predicting market moves, the "rubber band effect" (16:00) Owning founder-led companies (19:30) Building the next Berkshire Hathaway Thanks to our partners for making this possible! EY - Agentic AI is introducing a new investment discipline. As AI shifts to consumption-based models, EY connects s ✦ AI generated

timeline · colored by role

01
Claim

The biggest change in my investment philosophy over time is an appreciation for the importance of long-term, durable, protected, non-disruptible business quality.

Ackman explains that as he has become a larger, more concentrated investor, his biggest evolution has been recognizing the importance of durable business quality over shorter-term activist plays.

transcript

Bill Ackman: So I would say the biggest change over time is an appreciation for the importance of what they call business quality, long-term, durable, protected, non-disruptible growth. I would say early days, you're a smaller, more liquid investor. You don't have to think as long-term as you become a bigger, concentrated investor. And over time, you learn the importance of durable kind of growth. That's the most important factor.

explains mechanism · 2gives example · 1

02
Claim

The biggest change in my investment philosophy over time is an appreciation for the importance of long-term, durable, protected, non-disruptible business quality — the most important factor in investing.

Ackman explains that his evolution as an investor has been a shift toward prioritizing durable business quality over shorter-term activism, though he remains as activist as ever — just more active on Twitter than in boardrooms now.

transcript

Bill Ackman: So I would say the biggest change over time is an appreciation for the importance of what they call business quality, long-term, durable, protected, non-disruptible growth. I would say early days, you're a smaller, more liquid investor. You don't have to think as long-term as you become a bigger, concentrated investor. And over time, you learn the importance of durable kind of growth. That's the most important factor. I would say I'm as activist as I've ever been, but more of it's on Twitter than I would say in the corporate context.

explains mechanism · 1supports · 1

03
Claim

This is the greatest era in history to build a business, but the risk of disruption for existing companies has gone up dramatically because startups have unlimited access to compute, capital, and talent, making disruption risk the hardest thing for a long-term investor to assess.

Ackman argues that AI has made the threat of disruption higher than ever, but high-quality established companies are being overlooked as capital chases the new thing, creating a valuation opportunity similar to Berkshire Hathaway during the 2000 dot-com bubble.

transcript

Bill Ackman: Look, when you're a concentrated investor or an investor generally and you're a long-term investor, the most important and most challenging thing to do is determine what's the risk of disruption. What's the risk of two guys, two women from Stanford in a garage coming up with something? That risk, I think, has gone up dramatically. This is the greatest era in history just to build a business, right? There's unlimited access to compute, certainly for a startup. unlimited access to capital, and a lot of incredible talent, which means that the probability of your being disrupted has gone up enormously. So the hardest thing you have to do as an investor is understand, and that's really where we spend most of our time. What's interesting about markets is people always bring their eye to the new thing. And the new thing is sort of chips and semiconductors and energy. And that's where the shorter term capital is going. What tends to happen is really high quality things get left behind. And the same thing really happened, I was there in 2000, in that sort of bubble. This is different, I'm not saying this is, but there's some analogies. And the analogies are people got excited about internet stocks and Berkshire Hathaway traded at the lowest valuation I think it ever traded out in its history, as people said, Oh, okay, that's all old stuff. I think a similar thing is happening today, in a sense, to Amazon and Meta, Microsoft.

explains mechanism · 1

04
Claim

This is the greatest era in history to build a business, which means the risk of disruption for incumbent companies has gone up dramatically.

Ackman argues that unlimited compute, capital, and talent for startups make this the best time ever to build a business, dramatically raising disruption risk for established companies.

transcript

Bill Ackman: Look, when you're a concentrated investor or an investor generally and you're a long-term investor, the most important and most challenging thing to do is determine what's the risk of disruption. What's the risk of two guys, two women from Stanford in a garage coming up with something? That risk, I think, has gone up dramatically. This is the greatest era in history just to build a business, right? There's unlimited access to compute, certainly for a startup. unlimited access to capital, and a lot of incredible talent, which means that the probability of your being disrupted has gone up enormously. So the hardest thing you have to do as an investor is understand, and that's really where we spend most of our time.

explains mechanism · 1provides context · 1

05
Prediction

High quality companies are getting left behind as markets fixate on the AI 'new thing,' creating a huge opportunity — similar to Berkshire Hathaway's lowest valuation during the 2000 internet bubble.

Ackman draws a parallel to the 2000 bubble, arguing that today's market is leaving high-quality companies like Meta, Amazon, and Microsoft behind as capital chases AI chips and energy, making them undervalued.

transcript

Bill Ackman: What's interesting about markets is people always bring their eye to the new thing. And the new thing is sort of chips and semiconductors and energy. And that's where the shorter term capital is going. What tends to happen is really high quality things get left behind. And the same thing really happened, I was there in 2000, in that sort of bubble. This is different, I'm not saying this is, but there's some analogies. And the analogies are people got excited about internet stocks and Berkshire Hathaway traded at the lowest valuation I think it ever traded out in its history, as people said, Oh, okay, that's all old stuff. I think a similar thing is happening today, in a sense, to Amazon and Meta, Microsoft. Those are the ones that are... These are old-fashioned companies in kind of this, you know, the OpenAI. So they're undervalued in your mind. Yes.

extends · 1provides context · 1

06
Mechanism

Valuation acts like a rubber band tether on markets — when stocks get extremely cheap or expensive, the band inevitably pulls them back, and calling it out publicly can cause a psychological reset.

Ackman explains his market conviction calls by describing valuation as a rubber band: when stocks are irrationally cheap, the band pulls them up, and publicly stating this can trigger a collective psychological reset among investors.

transcript

Bill Ackman: Valuation is like a tether on the market, right? When it gets too high, it's like this rubber band that's stretching. Inevitably it bounces back, but it works the other way as well. When stocks get too cheap, there's this, the rubber bands actually pulling valuations up. And so there are certain moments where it gets to that place. And sometimes actually, if you call that out, it causes people to have kind of a psychological reset. Stocks just got crazy cheap, just incredibly cheap, of really high quality companies. I don't know why. Find extremely cheap in fundamentals. Fundamentals based on what's the value of a financial asset, the present value of the cash it generates over its life. On that basis, stocks of really high quality companies are really cheap.

explains mechanism · 1

07
Mechanism

Valuation is like a rubber band on the market — when stocks get too cheap, the rubber band pulls valuations back up, and calling that out publicly can cause a psychological reset that accelerates the move.

Ackman explains his willingness to make public market calls by describing valuation as a tether: when stocks are extremely cheap on a present-value-of-cash basis, the rubber band snaps back, and publicly stating conviction can help trigger that reset.

transcript

Bill Ackman: Valuation is like a tether on the market, right? When it gets too high, it's like this rubber band that's stretching. Inevitably it bounces back, but it works the other way as well. When stocks get too cheap, there's this, the rubber bands actually pulling valuations up. And so there are certain moments where it gets to that place. And sometimes actually, if you call that out, it causes people to have kind of a psychological reset.

08
Claim

The average S&P 500 CEO tenure is about 3-4 years, and those CEOs are focused on short-term compensation with no big economic stake — whereas a founder-CEO treats the company as their entire life and reputation, giving them the authority and long-term incentive to make the hard calls that generate outsized returns.

Ackman endorses the thesis that founder-led companies outperform because founders have long time horizons, total reputation on the line, voting authority, and a track record of making difficult strategic calls.

transcript

Bill Ackman: Yeah, I think the answer is exactly what you said. I think the average life of an S&P 500 CEO is probably, I don't know, four years or three years, 3 1/2 years or something like this. And you're focused on kind of shorter term compensation. You generally don't have a big economic stake in the business. A founder — this is your entire life. It's your entire reputation. It's not like you're going to go get another job. You got to kind of make it work. And also, when you're in the boardroom, you have the authority of either being a major voting voice or a — you've got a huge economic stake in the company. When we join the board of a company, we're often the largest or the largest non-index fund type shareholder. That kind of gives us a little bit of a disproportionate voice in the boardroom. Imagine if you have that and you're CEO of the company, right? So I think that does give you, and also if you've gotten to be a successful founder over time, guarantee that you've made a number of very challenging calls over time that turned out to be right. Otherwise, you wouldn't be there. And so you look at Mark Zuckerberg, right, when he bought, I don't know, Instagram, everyone was like shocked at the price paid, or WhatsApp. They seemed like sort of outside the, the company only had, whatever, 19 employees or something when he paid a billion something. But you make enough of those calls, and you can make the other —

explains mechanism · 2extends · 1

09
Claim

Founder-led companies have a structural advantage in navigating disruptive environments because founders have the authority, economic stake, and long-term mindset to make radical decisions that professional CEOs with 3-4 year horizons cannot.

Ackman agrees with the thesis that founder-led companies outperform in changing environments. Founders have their entire reputation on the line, huge economic stakes, boardroom authority, and a proven track record of making tough calls — unlike average S&P 500 CEOs who face short tenures and incentive to avoid mistakes.

transcript

Bill Ackman: Yeah, I think the answer is exactly what you said. I think the is that the average life of an S&P 500 CEO is probably, I don't know, four years or three years, 3 1/2 years or something like this. And you're focused on kind of shorter term compensation. You generally don't have a big economic stake in the business. You're A founder. This is your entire life. It's your entire reputation. It's not like you're going to go get another job. You got to kind of make it work. And also, when you're in the boardroom, you have the authority of either being a major voting voice or a You've got a huge economic stake in the company. When we join the board of a company, we're often the largest or the largest non-index fund type shareholder. That kind of gives us a little bit of a disproportionate voice in the boardroom. Imagine if you have that and you're CEO of the company, right? So I think that does give you, and also if you've gotten to be a successful founder over time, guarantee that you've made a number of very challenging calls over time that turned out to be right. Otherwise, you wouldn't be there. And so you look at Mark Zuckerberg, right, when he bought, I don't know, Instagram, everyone was like shocked at the price paid, or WhatsApp. They seemed like sort of outside the, the company only had, whatever, 19 employees or something when he paid a billion something. But you make enough of those calls, and you can make the other

explains mechanism · 2

10
Claim

We are transforming Howard Hughes into a compounding machine on the Berkshire Hathaway model — using a discounted real estate company as the vehicle to own insurance float and invest the surplus in equities, aiming to build a trillion-dollar thing over 50 years.

Ackman details how he is turning Howard Hughes into a Berkshire Hathaway 2.0: buying the real estate company at a discount to liquidation value, then using insurance float (with assets in Treasuries and surplus in equities) to create a tax-efficient compounding machine over decades.

transcript

Bill Ackman: And the vast majority of the value he created at Berkshire was through actually the ownership of insurance operation. And what's interesting about insurance is that running an insurance company, you have two jobs. One is you write business, right? You take risk. You collect premiums in exchange for the obligation to pay future claims. And then you get money up front, and your responsibility is to invest that money. The vast majority of insurance companies focus only on the liability side of the balance sheet. Buffett was really the first to focus on, actually more on the asset side of the balance sheet than on the liability side. Over time, on the liability side. If you manage the assets of an insurance company well and the liabilities well, you can build this enormously profitable, compounding, tax-efficient machine over time. And the question is, why haven't other people done this? And the answer is, if you're really good at investing, You go work for a hedge fund, you go work for Fidelity, you go work for Wellington, but you don't go work for an insurance company. So the insurance company's ability to recruit investment talent is very limited. Buffett owned half the company. He was really good at investing, which is why it worked. So what we're doing is we're, you know, Buffett started with a crappy textile company. He effectively liquidated it over time, reinvested in insurance, and then invested the assets well. Howard Hughes is actually a really interesting company, but it's a business that Wall Street has not cared about for a long period of time. We created it out of the bankruptcy of General Growth. It was a spin-off of all the other assets. And it's a company that owns these small cities. So I bet a lot of people here have heard of Summerlin, because a lot of the tech community has moved from California to Las Vegas. But we own this small city, 26,000 acres of land. We own all the commercial land. We own all the residential land. We sell lots of home builders. We build a downtown. It's a bit like the Irvine company. Don Bren created probably $100 billion of personal wealth managing a small city. So super cool company, but the time frame is decades as opposed to quarters. So Wall Street's never cared. It's always traded a huge discount. So Buffett bought into a textile business at a discount to liquidation value. At $63 a share, you're owning Howard Hughes at a discount to liquidation value. What we're doing is instead of reinvesting all the cash the business generates into real estate, we're going to reinvest all the cash into insurance within the next week or so. You're in the business of building this flywheel. We're going to build this into a compounding machine over the next 50 years. It's something I've always wanted to do. We have the benefit of understanding both the insurance side of the business and we can manage the assets well. And you can buy it at whatever, 60 cents on the dollar.

gives example · 1

11
Mechanism

We are building the next Berkshire Hathaway by repurposing Howard Hughes — a real estate company trading at a discount to liquidation value — into an insurance-anchored compounding machine, using the same playbook Buffett used: reinvest float into treasuries, surplus into equities, and never dilute shareholders.

Ackman lays out his plan to turn Howard Hughes Corporation into a Berkshire Hathaway-style entity by redirecting its cash flow into insurance operations, applying Buffett's model of managing float and surplus, and compounding over decades.

transcript

Bill Ackman: The vast majority of the value he created at Berkshire was through actually the ownership of insurance operation. And what's interesting about insurance is that running an insurance company, you have two jobs. One is you write business, right? You take risk. You collect premiums in exchange for the obligation to pay future claims. And then you get money up front, and your responsibility is to invest that money. The vast majority of insurance companies focus only on the liability side of the balance sheet. Buffett was really the first to focus on, actually more on the asset side of the balance sheet than on the liability side. If you manage the assets of an insurance company well and the liabilities well, you can build this enormously profitable, compounding, tax-efficient machine over time. And the question is, why haven't other people done this? And the answer is, if you're really good at investing, you go work for a hedge fund, you go work for Fidelity, you go work for Wellington, but you don't go work for an insurance company. So the insurance company's ability to recruit investment talent is very limited. Buffett owned half the company. He was really good at investing, which is why it worked. So what we're doing is we're, you know, Buffett started with a crappy textile company. He effectively liquidated it over time, reinvested in insurance, and then invested the assets well. Howard Hughes is actually a really interesting company, but it's a business that Wall Street has not cared about for a long period of time. [...] At $63 a share, you're owning Howard Hughes at a discount to liquidation value. What we're doing is instead of reinvesting all the cash the business generates into real estate, we're going to reinvest all the cash into insurance within the next week or so. We're going to build this into a compounding machine over the next 50 years. It's something I've always wanted to do. We have the benefit of understanding both the insurance side of the business and we can manage the assets well. And you can buy it at whatever, 60 cents on the dollar.

extends · 1gives example · 3

Highlight slides
Shift Toward Business Quality Over Activism✦ from: The biggest change in my investment philosophy over time is an appreciation for the importance of long-term, durable, protected, non-disruptible business quality — the most important factor in investing.Evolution Toward Durable Quality✦ from: The biggest change in my investment philosophy over time is an appreciation for the importance of long-term, durable, protected, non-disruptible business quality.Greatest Era to Build, Highest Risk to Incumbents✦ from: This is the greatest era in history to build a business, but the risk of disruption for existing companies has gone up dramatically because startups have unlimited access to compute, capital, and talent, making disruption risk the hardest thing for a long-term investor to assess.Disruption risk for incumbents has surged✦ from: This is the greatest era in history to build a business, which means the risk of disruption for incumbent companies has gone up dramatically.What's driving the risk✦ from: This is the greatest era in history to build a business, which means the risk of disruption for incumbent companies has gone up dramatically.Market Misallocation: Old vs. New✦ from: This is the greatest era in history to build a business, but the risk of disruption for existing companies has gone up dramatically because startups have unlimited access to compute, capital, and talent, making disruption risk the hardest thing for a long-term investor to assess.Founders vs. S&P 500 CEOs: Structural Disadvantage✦ from: Founder-led companies have a structural advantage in navigating disruptive environments because founders have the authority, economic stake, and long-term mindset to make radical decisions that professional CEOs with 3-4 year horizons cannot.Why Founders Make the Tough Calls✦ from: Founder-led companies have a structural advantage in navigating disruptive environments because founders have the authority, economic stake, and long-term mindset to make radical decisions that professional CEOs with 3-4 year horizons cannot.Ackman's Berkshire Playbook for Howard Hughes✦ from: We are building the next Berkshire Hathaway by repurposing Howard Hughes — a real estate company trading at a discount to liquidation value — into an insurance-anchored compounding machine, using the same playbook Buffett used: reinvest float into treasuries, surplus into equities, and never dilute shareholders.Why Insurance Compounding Is Rare✦ from: We are building the next Berkshire Hathaway by repurposing Howard Hughes — a real estate company trading at a discount to liquidation value — into an insurance-anchored compounding machine, using the same playbook Buffett used: reinvest float into treasuries, surplus into equities, and never dilute shareholders.
Related episodes